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ABSTRACT 
Computer networks are vulnerable to attacks from outside threats. Intrusion detection 
systems are used to monitor computer networks for attacker activity. Intrusion detection systems 
consist of a set of sensors placed strategically throughout a computer network. The large 
amounts of data produced by intrusion detection system sensors may be sent to and processed by 
information fusion engines. Information fusion engines correlate alerts and identify attack paths 
of attackers. Sensor management strategies are developed to minimize the time taken to process 
attack data, minimize the bandwidth used by the security system of a network, and maximize the 
number of attacks successfully tracked. An experimental performance evaluation is conducted on 
sensor management strategies utilizing a variety of representative network topologies, network 
sizes, alert rates and attack scenarios so that a robust sensor management strategy can be 
identified. Performance measures of interest include the average time taken to process a real alert 
at the fusion engine, the percentage of real alerts processed, the percentage of noise alerts 
processed, the average bandwidth used to transfer alerts, and ability of a sensor management rule 
to successfully track multiple attacks consistently. Results indicate rules that attempt to meet but 
not exceed network constraints outperform rules that disregard network constraints. Additionally, 
rules that take into consideration the progress of current attacks also show some benefits.  
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1. INTRODUCTION TO SENSOR MANAGEMENT IN THE CYBER DOMAIN 
 
For several decades computers have been connected to one another in order to share 
access to information, programs and resources (Maran Graphics Inc., 1997). Networks were 
created to make computing more efficient and to reduce resource requirements. Networks allow 
multiple users to access the same file without the need of media transfer devices such as floppy 
discs, compact discs, or flash drives. Multiple users on the same network can access shared 
printers as well as licenses to expensive software.  
 Networks can range in size from a few computers connected in a Local Area Network in 
someone’s home, to thousands of computers connected within a corporate office building. 
Networks can stretch between buildings and connect several buildings in a city or around the 
world. The largest and most well known network is the Internet which connects millions of 
computers worldwide (Maran Graphics Inc., 1997).  
Networks that connect to the internet or some other external network are vulnerable to 
attack from enemies outside the network. Attacks from outside sources may include attempts to 
access secure information stored on servers, such as trying to access social security numbers, 
credit card numbers, or nuclear secrets held on file on secure servers. Attackers may also try to 
use a network’s e-mail server to send unwanted and possibly malicious e-mail to thousands of 
recipients. Additionally, among many alternatives an attacker may create a denial of service 
attack, which floods the network with packets of unwanted information and creates so much 
traffic that legitimate network usage cannot take place (Crothers, 2003).  
With the vulnerability of computer networks to attacks came ways to prevent attackers 
from gaining access to networks. Methods of preventing attackers from infiltrating networks are 
called intrusion prevention sytems because they are designed to prevent attackers from entering a 
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network. A well known intrusion prevention method is the use of passwords and user accounts to 
allow only people with access privileges to use the network. Other methods of intrusion 
prevention include firewalls which buffer a network’s intranet from the external Internet by 
allowing access to the internal network only from trusted sources. While intrusion prevention 
devices work to limit access to a computer network, sometimes these devices fail to prevent all 
attacks, and an intruder succeeds in gaining access to the network (Crothers, 2003 and Bejtlich, 
2004).  
If an intruder successfully passes through a network’s intrusion prevention system, there 
is another layer of network security that can be used to monitor an intruder’s activities. This 
layer is called an Intrusion Detection System or IDS. An intrusion detection system monitors 
network traffic and host based activity for signs that an intruder is inside the network. Intrusion 
detection systems do not prevent network intrusions, but instead monitor the network to help 
identify if an intruder has passed through the intrusion prevention system and gained access to 
the network.  
An intrusion detection system is made up of sensors placed strategically around a 
computer network. Sensors can be network based sensors or host based sensors. Network 
sensors, usually placed on switches, taps, and routers, monitor packets traveling between 
network machines, and often use pattern matching techniques to identify potentially harmful 
packets. Host based sensors are associated with a device such as a computer or server on the 
network, and monitor activities such as modifications to sensitive files or changes to security 
settings on an individual machine. The sensors follow predefined rules and generate alerts when 
an activity occurs that matches a certain format or signature (Crothers, 2003 and Bejtlich, 2004). 
For example, an alert may be generated each time a user enters his password incorrectly.   
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The sensor is not able to tell if the action that generated the alert is malicious or a result 
of ordinary network activity. The task of sifting through the alerts generated by IDS sensors to 
identify the alerts that correspond to malicious activity is often left up to a network analyst. 
Many alerts generated by the IDS sensors do not correspond to malicious activity. The alerts that 
do not correspond to malicious activity are often called false alarms, or noise. A false alarm is an 
alert that corresponds to a real network activity, but the activity was not intended to harm to the 
network (Crothers, 2003).  
Intrusion detection sensors generate high volumes of alerts which are often sent to a 
central server for a network analyst to easily look at all the alerts. Alerts traveling to the central 
server use valuable network bandwidth to do so, and many of the alerts that are sent are not a 
result of malicious activity. The high volume of alerts arriving from a variety of sensors may 
easily overwhelm even the best network analyst (Crothers, 2003 and Sabata, 2006). Using an 
information fusion system can help to sort through the thousands of alerts in order to identify 
attacks, correlate alerts from multiple sensors, and track the path of the attacker through the 
network. 
Due to the high number of alerts, the task of sorting through all the alerts to find the few 
malicious alerts and correlating the malicious alerts together is often impractical and difficult for 
a human analyst. Efforts have been made to automate the process using information fusion 
techniques. Information fusion engines use a variety of mathematical techniques to identify true 
alerts and find correlations between alerts to discover the attack path of the attacker (Chan, 2005, 
Sudit, 2005 and Sabata, 2006). In order for fusion engines to be effective they must receive 
information from the network sensors in a timely manner, so that an attacker’s actions can be 
tracked in near real time. The ability of fusion engines to track an attack correctly may also be 
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influenced by the amount of noise in the dataset the engines receives. The less noise the fusion 
engines receive the faster the engines will be at identifying the attack track of the intruder. Figure 
1-1 is a depiction of a simple network illustrating the use of intrusion prevention devices, 
network intrusion detection sensors, and two distributed information fusion engines.  
 
Figure 1-1 Network with Intrusion Prevention, Intrusion Detection, and Fusion Engines 
 
In an ideal intrusion detection system, every alert generated by an intrusion detection 
sensor would be sent immediately to the fusion engine. At the fusion engine, the alert would be 
processed in a timely manner leading to the perfect tracking of all attack paths in the network. 
Unfortunately, there are a variety of constraints in a computer network that may limit the 
intrusion detection system. These limiting constraints include limits on the processing 
capabilities of the fusion engine and limits on the bandwidth available for system security. In 
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order to mitigate these constraints on fusion engine processing capabilities and available 
bandwidth, sensor management strategies can be employted. 
This research looks at the interplay between the intrusion detection sensors and the fusion 
engines. Specifically, this research develops event based rules to direct data from the intrusion 
detection sensors to the fusion engines. These rules focus on sending the fusion engines the most 
pertinent information, in order to minimize the time required to process a real alert, minimize 
noise sent to the fusion engines, maximize the percentage of attack alerts that are processed, 
maximize the number of attacks tracked, and minimize network bandwidth usage.  
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2. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Sensor management strategies can have a significant affect on the performance of 
intrusion detection systems. The sensor management strategies developed in this thesis must be 
effective at minimizing the time to process real attack alerts, minimizing noise sent to the fusion 
engine, maximizing the number of attack alerts processed, maximizing the number of attacks 
tracked, and minimizing bandwidth used. A sensor management strategy that reaches all these 
goals will aid an information fusion system in effectively processing the most relevant IDS data 
to identify and take action against cyber attacks. 
Several steps are taken to develop and test the sensor management rules. First, the rules 
themselves are designed for information fusion systems with processing and network bandwidth 
constraints. Second, performance measures are developed to use in the objective evaluation of 
the rules. Third, a cyber network simulation environment is created to test the developed rules. 
Finally, an experiment is designed and performed in order to identify the best performing rules as 
well as factors that significantly affect the performance of sensor management rules. 
The main objectives of this thesis can be summarized as follows: 
1. Develop event based dispatching rules that can be used to determine when sensors should 
send alerts to distributed fusion engines; 
2. Develop metrics to track the effectiveness of the rules with respect to the time taken to 
process a real alert, the amount of noise processed at the fusion engine, the number of 
real alerts processed at the fusion engine, the number of attacks tracked, and the amount 
of bandwidth used to send alerts to the fusion engine; 
3. Develop a simulation environment to model the sensor dispatching rules in the cyber 
domain; 
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4. Use the simulation to test the developed rules versus a variety of commonly used sensor 
management strategies; 
5. Identify network factors that have a significant affect on the performance of sensor 
management strategies; and 
6. Identify robust sensor management strategies for cyber security systems. 
The goal of this research is to identify sensor management strategies that perform well for 
a variety of network configurations and attack scenarios, as well as provide strong results across 
a set of performance measures. A good sensor management strategy enables the fusion engines 
of an intrusion detection system to process real alerts in a timely manner. Fusion engines that 
process real alerts promptly, increase the effectiveness of intrusion detection systems by alerting 
analysts to attack tracks faster.  The sooner an analyst learns of an attack in progress, the more 
chance an analyst will have to prevent the attacker from reaching his goal. 
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3. BACKGROUND ON NETWORK INTRUSION, INTRUSION DETECTION 
SYSTEMS, AND INFORMATION FUSION 
 
. This section of the paper gives background information on attacker behavior, intrusion 
detection systems, and information fusion. First, a brief discussion on network intrusion and the 
anatomy of typical network attacks is discussed. This is followed by an extended discussion of 
intrusion detection systems so that they can be better understood in relation to this thesis topic. 
Finally, the intrusion detection discussion leads into a discussion of information fusion that is 
used to correlate intrusion detection sensor alerts.  
 
 Network Intrusion 
While this paper is not a tutorial on network attack techniques, knowing that computer 
attacks often have several stages of an attack in common with one another is important. A 
computer attack can take any number of forms depending on the skill and the intent of the 
attacker. Attackers range in skill level from low skill level attackers, or script-kiddies,  blindly 
running pre-coded scripts on networks to find well known entry points, to very highly skilled 
methodical attackers that take the time and energy necessary to plan out and implement a 
successful attack (Crothers, 2003). 
The highly skilled attackers may have a variety of agendas for their attacks including, but 
not limited to, the following: data modification, data deletion, data access, system modification, 
program execution, privilege escalation, program installation, or security system detection 
avoidance(Crothers, 2003). To pursue any of these goals attackers commonly go through five 
phases of an attack: reconnaissance, exploitation, reinforcement, consolidation and finally 
pillage, as depicted in Figure 3-1 (Bejtlich, 2005). 
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The reconnaissance stage of the attack is the first phase in the attack sequence. During 
this stage the attacker attempts to identify vulnerabilities in the network security such as open 
ports or applications with known security problems. Reconnaissance is a very common step in 
structured attacks where the attacker has a goal for the overall attack, and wants to carry out the 
goal in the most efficient manner possible. Unstructured attacks, such as those run by script-
kiddies, will often skip reconnaissance and run an attack on every network available to them in 
hopes an attack works on at least some. Reconnaissance can include non-technical activities too, 
such as digging in a corporation’s trash for passwords and user accounts or paying insiders for 
information. These non-technical activities go undetected by intrusion detection systems 
(Bejtlich, 2005). 
The second stage of the attack is called exploitation. During this stage attackers attempt 
to use a service for something other than the service’s original design. The attackers may also 
make a service perform unusual tasks or stop a service from running altogether. If a service is 
Figure 3-1: Stages of a Network Attack (Bejtlich, 2005) 
Reconnaissance 
Identify network vulnerabilities
Exploitation 
Illegitimate use of network 
services
Reinforcement 
Gain additional capabilities 
Consolidation 
Return to compromised machine
Pillage 
Accomplish ultimate attack goal
  Stages of a Network Attack 
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stopped, sometimes the attacker is able to use the privilege level of that service for his own use 
(Bejtlich, 2005).  
The third attack stage is reinforcement. During this stage attackers gain additional 
network capabilities through their initial entrance into the network. They may choose to elevate 
their user privileges or transfer malicious code from their computer to the network under attack. 
During the reinforcement stage the attacker may create a backdoor to allow communication with 
computers outside the network, and to allow an easy reentrant point to the network that will go 
unnoticed by security (Bejtlich, 2005).  
The fourth stage of the attack is called consolidation. During this stage the attacker 
returns to the network via the backdoor created earlier. Once he has gained access to the network 
he is free to do whatever he pleases as long as his privilege level allows the activity (Bejtlich, 
2005). 
Finally, the last stage of the attack is the pillage stage. During the pillage stage the 
attacker accomplishes her true goal of the attack. This may include stealing sensitive files, 
stealing user names and passwords, or setting up a system for a future attack (Bejtlich, 2005). 
Knowing the attack steps that have already occurred is valuable when trying to identify 
the most pertinent information to send to a fusion engine. Unfortunately, these five attack steps 
are merely a guideline for attacker behavior, and are not necessarily followed by every attacker. 
Attacker behavior may be unpredictable because attackers are traveling blindly through a 
network, and do not necessarily know the location of their target machine. Additionally, 
attackers are constantly finding new and surprising methods to infiltrate networks that may go 
unnoticed by intrusion detection systems (Holsopple, 2006).  
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 Intrusion Detection Systems 
 As described in the introduction most networks have a layer of security including 
firewalls that aims at preventing intruders from entering the network. These systems are 
invaluable for protecting network security, but due to the craftiness of modern attackers they can 
often be compromised and fail. The failure rates of intrusion prevention devices prompted the 
development of intrusion detection systems in the late 1990’s as a second blanket of security 
(Bejtlich, 2005). Intrusion detection systems do not prevent attackers from entering the network, 
but act as an alarm system that alerts security to an attacker’s potential presence.  
 Intrusion detection systems (IDS) for computer networks are made up of a set of sensors 
that are placed strategically around a network to look for suspicious activity. When suspicious 
activity is found, sensors generate and send an alert to the security analyst, often times a single 
person, to notify him of the activity. Intrusion detection systems work in a variety of methods to 
identify potential threats. The techniques sensors use to identify threats differ depending on the 
location of the sensor and the approach employed by the system as a whole. 
 Intrusion detection sensors are either network based sensors or host based sensors. A 
network based sensor is often associated with a router, switch, hub, or firewall, and its job is to 
look at all the packets of information traveling through the device. When the network sensor 
scans each packet the sensor performs pattern matching tasks to match the contents of the 
packets to known attack signatures. Pattern matching may be done on a single packet or on 
multiple packets to find malicious code that spans several packets (Crothers, 2003). If the 
network has a very high bandwidth, or a particularly busy switch, multiple sensors may be used 
to ensure that every packet is scanned. Network based sensors merely sense whether a packet 
matches an attack signature or not, the sensors do nothing to stop a packet if a malicious 
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signature is found. Some advantages of network based sensors are that network sensors detect 
both successful and unsuccessful attacks, network sensors are separate from host machines so 
they are less vulnerable to be tampered with by intruders, and network sensors can detect a large 
variety of malicious activity (Crothers, 2003). 
 Accompanying network sensors to monitor the network are host based sensors. Host 
based intrusion detection sensors are sensors that monitor activities on a host such as a server or 
a computer workstation. These sensors create logs to track suspicious activities on machines, 
such as tracking changes made to secure files. Host based sensors are implemented using 
software installed on each machine. The host based sensors use processing resources of the host, 
so setting security too tight will slow down the machine processing. Compared to network 
sensors, host based sensors are better at detecting new attacks and they create fewer false alarms 
than network sensors. Unlike network sensors, intruders may have the ability to modify sensor 
logs on a compromised machine if the host based sensors are not adequately secured (Crothers, 
2003).  
 A good intrusion detection system has both network and host based sensors in order to 
successfully track all manner of malicious activity. These intrusion detection sensors often times 
generate alerts for activities which are not malicious. For example, an alert may be generated 
when a user mistypes their password when trying to access the network. Intrusion detection 
systems are known to have high false alarm rates, and generate many false positives. A false 
positive is an alert that is genuine, but does not correspond to malicious behavior. A false 
negative occurs when no alert is generated, but an attack has occurred. False negatives may 
occur for new attacks or if an attacker is particularly stealthy. The rate of false positives to actual 
malicious alerts can be as high at one hundred to one (Crothers, 2003), especially when intrusion 
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detection systems are first put in place. The rate of false positives will be referred to as the noise 
rate in this thesis.  
Intrusion detection systems can be purchased as a security package available from a 
variety of retailers, but many systems and software packages are available for free such as Snort, 
Dragon, and Daiwatch (Bejtlich, 2005). Intrusion detection systems must have a security analyst 
(or several) available to sort through all the alerts generated during a typical day. Data from 
sensors is often sent to a secure intrusion detection server for a human analyst to look at. Efforts 
are being made to make the human analyst’s job easier by automating the attack detection 
process using information fusion techniques. Information fusion engines sort through all the 
alerts generated by the intrusion detection sensors, and through correlation and other techniques 
are able to identify and track attacks and eliminate the noise.  
 
 Information Fusion 
Due to the large amount of disjoint information being retrieved from the intrusion 
detection sensors, analysts are often overwhelmed by the amount of data they must wade through 
in order to identify a true attack. A group of well trained sensors watching 64,000 addresses can 
generate 25,000 to 50,000 alerts/day and over 100,000 alerts/day during peak activity (Sabata, 
2006). Information fusion is a natural solution to the problem of large amounts of disjoint data. A 
well designed information fusion engine can aid the human analyst to better understand all the 
alerts that are generated. As defined by the Australian Department of Defense, information 
fusion is “A multilevel, multi-faceted process dealing with the automatic detection, association, 
correlation, estimation, and combination of data and information from single and multiple 
sources” (Kang, 2003). With respect to network intrusion detection this means an information 
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fusion engine identifies alerts that correspond to real attacks, correlates them with alerts from 
other sensors to find the attack path of the intruder, and eventually predicts what the intruder 
may do next.  
According to the Joint Director’s Laboratory there are five defined levels of information 
fusion, levels zero through four. The thrust of this thesis deals with levels zero and four. A flow 
chart of intrusion detection fusion can be seen in Figure 3-2, followed by a brief discussion of 
each fusion level.  
 
Figure 3-2: Intrusion Detection Data Fusion (Bass, 2000, p.102) 
 
Fusion level zero is characterized by sub-object data assessment, or data refinement. With 
respect to intrusion detection this corresponds to the alerts generated by the IDS sensors. Level 
one fusion is object refinement. In cyber security this corresponds to relating the alerts generated 
by the IDS sensors to certain kinds of attacks. Level two is situation assessment or situation 
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refinement which looks at objects and their relationships to assess the current situation. In cyber 
security, fusion level two relates attack alerts to other attack alerts to determine the path of the 
attacker. Level three is impact assessment or threat assessment. This corresponds to determining 
what the target of the attack might be, and what will be the effect if the attack is successful. 
Level four fusion is process refinement and often deals with resource management (Sudit,2005). 
This paper focuses on process refinement with respect to retrieving data from intrusion detection 
sensors using a variety of dispatching rules.  
Many information fusion platforms have been put in place to use information fusion to 
help identify and track attacks through a computer network (Sabata, 2006, Sudit and Holsopple, 
2006). These fusion engines can correlate data from multiple sensors in order to find attacks that 
may be related, track attacks through the network, and eventually predict what the attack target 
is. Regardless of fusion engine used, they require data, and most fusion engines are currently 
requesting all the alerts from every intrusion detection sensors. 
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4. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In many sensor applications, intrusion detection systems included, the sensors gather a 
vast amount of data. Most cyber security sensor systems assume that all the data gathered by the 
sensors can be sent to the fusion engine, and furthermore that the fusion engine is capable of 
processing all of the data acquired in a timely manner. The ability to send all data to the fusion 
engine is not a valid assumption because there are many constraints in the network (Wang, 
2004), likewise the ability of the fusion engine to process all sensor data may be invalid because 
of constraints in the processing power of the fusion engine. Due to network bandwidth 
constraints and fusion engine processing constraints, only a subset of data generated by all the 
sensors can be sent to the fusion engine. Which sensors to pull data from, at what time, and what 
data to pull from the chosen sensors become important questions to ask in a resource constrained 
network. 
Bandwidth constraints exist in computer networks. Even though standard computer 
networks often have high bandwidth, sending too many sensor messages has the potential to 
slow down the communication for daily network activities and cause slow network performance. 
While there may not be a tight constraint, minimizing bandwidth use by network sensors is 
important in order to not interfere with required network performance.  
There has been a significant amount of research recently in the field of sensor 
management and sensor scheduling. Much of the research is applied to distributed sensor 
networks with tight bandwidth and energy constraints. While cyber networks do not have the 
same tight bandwidth constraints, much can still be learned from the research. Research is 
focused mainly on using algorithms to schedule sensors, using weights for information quality, 
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and applying novel concepts such as network calculus or market based management to schedule 
sensors. 
There are many examples of research that use algorithms and integer and linear 
programming to schedule sensors. Algorithms offer a promising solution to sensor management 
because when executed these algorithms can provide an optimal sensor schedule. Algorithms 
have been developed to schedule the polling of data from sensors in order to maximize 
information value of data gathered while not exceeding bandwidth and energy constraints of the 
network. Unfortunately, often when using algorithm scheduling techniques, the algorithms 
developed are too difficult to solve in a timely manner. Heuristics, such as a one step ahead 
method or other techniques, are used to provide sub-optimal solutions to scheduling algorithms 
in real time (Sciacca, 2002 and Krishnamurthy, 2002).  
Another drawback of much of the algorithm based research is that the focus is only on 
polling one sensor at a time due to the assumption of a heavily bandwidth constrained network. 
In the case of network intrusion detection sensors, bandwidth is not as severe a constraint. More 
than one sensor can be polled at a time in a computer network, and in the cyber realm the focus 
is more on minimizing bandwidth use rather than meeting an extreme bandwidth constraint. 
These algorithms also assume that sensors are controlled by a central sensor polling agent, and 
do not allow sensors to decide for themselves whether they should send data or not. 
An interesting approach in use to enhance the ability of algorithms to properly schedule 
data collection is to split up a single sensor into multiple “virtual sensors”. Each virtual sensor 
holds a different type of information or a different quality level of information. For example, for 
a temperature sensor, one virtual sensor may hold temperature measured to the nearest degree, 
while another virtual sensor may hold the temperature to the nearest hundredth degree, while yet 
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another virtual sensor may only hold the binary information of whether the temperature is above 
freezing or not. By using virtual sensors, data can be polled that fits best with the current 
bandwidth constraints (Sciacca, 2002).  
 The flexibility of an algorithm approach allows a variety of considerations to be 
incorporated into the models. One algorithm includes the recognition that some sensor 
measurements may take more time and contribute more value to the overall observation than 
other sensors, so that sensors should not all be treated equally. The use of Hidden Markov 
models can make the past observations and past sensor choices influence the sensor that is 
chosen next (Krishnamurthy, 2002). 
Some algorithm based research is focused heavily on giving weights to sensors based on 
data quality (Zhang, 2002 and Nicholson, 2004). Weights are been used to assign values for data 
quality, data timeliness, and data importance related to the overall sensor network objective. The 
weights are used to effectively choose the data that would best serve the network objective 
(Zhang, 2002). Weighted values are also used to differentiate between the quality of the 
information and the information value. Information value is defined as a measure of relevance 
related to “how much does the information cost to acquire and what is the expected pay-off as a 
consequence of action upon it” (Nicholson, 2004, p.129).  
Assigning weighted values to sensor data addresses the problem of a sensor that produces 
so much information that only a subset can be sent to the fusion engine. The results of the 
scheduling system, which use a one step ahead scheduling algorithm, are compared to a sensor 
scheduler that went in cyclical order giving each sensor a chance to send data. The scheduler that 
took information value and quality into account naturally performs better (Nicholson, 2004).  
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 Other approaches to sensor management include a network calculus approach that uses 
network calculus to mathematically find resource allocation so as not to exceed bandwidth 
(Zhang, 2002). The network calculus approach focuses on a dynamic environment where one 
might want to look at different sensors depending on the current picture of the environment. The 
research focuses on a hierarchal distributed sensor network that was not very similar to the cyber 
intrusion detection sensor network.  
Another novel approach to sensor management uses a market based approach to 
effectively sell sensor resources to various buyers (Mullen, 2006 and Viswanath, 2005). The 
approach uses combinatorial auctions so that buyers can bid on the services of several sensor 
combined. The market based sensor management approach seems more aimed at a sensor 
network that is providing information to several fusion engines that are competing for the same 
sensor resources, but the market based approach is interesting and unique. 
Research is done in the area of using sensor networks to track mobile targets, such as 
airplanes, traveling over a set of distributed sensors. In such studies mobile targets are assumed 
to originate beyond the borders of the sensor network. The sensors’ job is then to track the 
mobile target as the target passes through the space monitored by the sensors. One approach 
taken to schedule such a sensor network is to keep all sensors on the perimeter of the sensor 
network on and sensing at all times. Keeping the perimeter sensors on, allows the network to 
consistently observe new targets entering the sensor area. While the perimeter sensors remain on 
at all times, the interior sensors are put into hibernation mode. Once a target is observed by the 
perimeter sensors, specific internal sensors are turned on based on a predicted path of the target 
(Yang & Sikdar, 2005). This approach works well at effectively tracking targets while 
conserving the limited sensor energy. 
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Some aspects of mobile target tracking are similar to tracking attacks in a computer 
network. In both situations the target is assumed to come from outside the network. In the case of 
a mobile target, the mobile target is assumed to approach the sensor network from outside the 
network’s boundaries. In the cyber network case, an attacker often enters the network through 
computers with access to an external network. The sensors on the computers with external access 
are analogous to the sensors on the perimeter of a distributed sensor network set up for tracking 
mobile targets. An approach similar to the target tracking approach could be used in a cyber 
environment to track cyber attacks. By requiring sensors on computers with external access to 
constantly send their alerts to the fusion engine, the fusion engine will be able to consistently 
observe new attacks as they start in a network. Additionally, only turning on sensors on 
machines that are vulnerable to attack based on the attack’s current path can also prevent 
unnecessary noise alerts from being sent to the fusion engine. 
While research is done in the area of sensor scheduling and sensor management, many of 
the papers are concerned with wireless distributed networks with extreme bandwidth constraints. 
Most papers research deals with meeting extreme bandwidth constraints rather than minimizing 
bandwidth use to have less impact on the network. The research often deals with energy and 
bandwidth constraints in the network, rather than processing constraints of the entity processing 
the sensor information. The papers often present complicated algorithms that are too difficult to 
solve in a timely manner, and none were found that presented simple queuing strategies or event 
based rules to schedule sending sensor data.  
Future research can use some of the details of the existing sensor management research 
such as including the value of data held at the sensors in scheduling rules, developing virtual 
sensors to store different types of alerts, and comparing results to cyclical or random rules. This 
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paper attempts to develop event based rules that try to reduce bandwidth use and reduce noise 
sent to the fusion engine in order to better track network attacks while reducing use of network 
resources. Additionally, this research develops rules that are easy to implement and do not 
involve complicated intractable algorithms. 
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5. SENSOR MANAGEMENT RULES 
Sensor management rules are used to mitigate the constraints of intrusion detection 
systems, including fusion engine processing constraints and bandwidth constraints.  Sending all 
alerts generated to the fusion engines may not be a practical management strategy because fusion 
engines have limited processing capabilities.  In order for information fusion engines to remain 
responsive to current network condition, sensor management strategies must closely monitor the 
use of the fusion engine resource.   Additionally, sensor management strategies must ensure that 
bandwidth usage does not exceed the amount set aside for security use. 
There are four resource situations that an intrusion detection system may encounter while 
attempting to process alerts: stable, under fusion engine capacity, over fusion engine capacity, or 
over bandwidth capacity. When the intrusion detection system is stable, the number of alerts sent 
to the fusion engine does not exceed the bandwidth allocated to the security system, while at the 
same time enough alerts are delivered to the fusion engine to keep the fusion engine busy. When 
the system is sending all desired alerts to the fusion engine, but the fusion engine has extra 
capacity available to process alerts, the system is said to be in the under fusion engine capacity 
state. If the number of alerts sent to the fusion engine exceeds the capacity of the fusion engine 
to process the alerts and the queue at the fusion engine has grown above a predefined threshold, 
the system is in the over fusion engine capacity state. Finally, when the number of alerts sent to 
the fusion engine exceeds the bandwidth allocated to the security system, the system is in the 
over bandwidth capacity state.  
To accommodate the four possible states that the system could be in, a tiered rule 
structure was developed. The rule structure specifies a main rule that is used to identify the 
‘wants’ of the fusion engine, then, depending on the state of the system, a subset of the fusion 
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wants, all of the fusion wants, or all of the fusion wants plus additional alerts will be sent to the 
fusion engine. The fusion engine ‘wants’ are defined as the alerts that the fusion engine would 
most like to receive if the system had no constraints. The diagram below in Figure 5-1 shows the 
rules available in each state, each of which is described in the following sections.  
 
Figure 5-1: Rule Hierarchy 
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Monitoring System State 
 
 In order to monitor the state of the system, a check is performed at regular time intervals, 
in the case of this experiment an interval of one second is used. During this check, the amount of 
bandwidth used for that second, the number of alerts sent to the fusion engine that second, and 
the length of the fusion engine queue are checked. The amount of bandwidth used, the number of 
alerts sent to the fusion engine, and the length of the fusion engine queue combine to determine 
whether the system is in the stable, under capacity or over capacity states.   
 The sensor management rules start by following the rule selected for the stable state, 
referred to as the main rule of the sensor management strategy.  The rule followed during the 
stable state determines the fusion engine wants, or the set of alerts that the sensor management 
strategy would send to the fusion engine if the system were unconstrained.  The stable system 
may have a small queue built up at the fusion engine, but the queue at the fusion engine has not 
yet reached the critical length required to activate the over capacity state.  Additionally, the 
bandwidth used for a system in stable state is not exceeding the bandwidth allotted to the security 
system.  Figure 5-2 depicts a system in stable state.   
 
Figure 5-2: Stable System State 
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A system enters the over capacity state if at least one of the following two conditions is 
met: the length of the fusion engine queue exceeds a predefined critical length or the number of  
alerts waiting for bandwidth availability exceeds the same predefined length. Once in the over 
capacity state the system follows the pre-selected over capacity rule.  The over capacity rule 
chooses a subset of the fusion engine wants to send to the fusion engine. The system remains in 
the over capacity state until the queue at the fusion engine or the queue of alerts waiting for 
bandwidth recedes to a predefined minimum threshold level.  Once the offending queue recedes 
to the minimum threshold the system once again enters the stable state.  Figure 5-3 depicts a 
system in the over capacity state caused by both a long fusion engine queue and high bandwidth 
usage. 
 
Figure 5-3: Over Capacity System State 
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state merely sends additional alerts to the fusion engine above the defined fusion wants.  A 
system in the under capacity state would have a very short or nonexistent fusion engine queue 
and very low bandwidth usage as depicted in Figure 5-4.  
 
Figure 5-4: Under Capacity State 
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rules, followed by the internal monitor rule, and then the standby rule. The priority of a rule is 
used when resetting sensors after attacks have been completed. 
When starting a new scenario only the sensors with external access are allowed to send 
alerts to the fusion engine, all other sensors are set to standby. A sensor in standby mode receives 
and stores all alerts, but does not attempt to send any alerts to the fusion engine. The initial 
sensor settings are recorded in a default attack set that maintains the settings of the sensors 
before any attacks have progressed through the network. 
 The external monitor rule has a specified minimum priority and maximum batch size. 
The minimum priority corresponds to the minimum priority required of an alert before the alert 
can be sent to the fusion engine. The maximum batch size is the largest number of alerts allowed 
to be stored at a sensor before they are automatically sent to the fusion engine. Sensors set to the 
external monitor mode may send an arriving alert to the fusion engine only if the alert is above 
the specified minimum priority. If an alert arrives at an external monitor sensor that is not above 
the minimum priority then the alert is stored at the sensor until the maximum batch size is 
reached or the rule requests the alert. Once the maximum batch size is reached, all alerts batched 
at that sensor are sent to the fusion engine.  A flowchart of the actions taken by a sensor 
operating under the external monitor rule can be seen in Figure 5-5.  
As the fusion engine processes the alerts received, attack tracks are created for attacks in 
progress. An attack track is a series of machines that have been targeted in an attack. The fusion 
engine will generate a new attack track for each unique attack in the attack scenario. When an 
attack track is created, altered, or a new alert associated with an existing attack track is found, the 
fusion engine notifies the Connectivity and Priority rule.  
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Figure 5-5: Connectivity and Priority: External and Internal Monitor Rule Flowchart 
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sensor in internal monitor mode, the alert is checked to see if the priority is greater than or equal 
to the minimum priority level. If the received alert is at or above the minimum priority level the 
alert is sent immediately to the fusion engine. All other alerts are batched at the sensor. Alerts 
not sent to the fusion engine are placed in a queue based on priority and time, with the highest 
priority and most recent alert placed first in the queue and the oldest alert with lowest priority 
placed last in the queue.  
 
Figure 5-6: Connectivity and Priority: Switching from Standby to Internal Monitor Rule Flowchart 
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of the three sensor modes: external monitor mode, internal monitor mode, and standby as 
determined for that attack. As attacks are complete the attack sets generated by the Connectivity 
and Priority rule can be removed from the system and sensors can be reset as necessary. 
An attack is considered complete only if the attack scenario is done creating alerts for 
that attack, all sensors no longer contain alerts from that attack in their queues, and the fusion 
engine queue does not contain any alerts from that attack. Once an attack is complete, the fusion 
engine notifies the Connectivity and Priority rule. The attack set associated with the completed 
attack is then removed from the set of active attack sets. All sensors are then reset to the highest 
priority rule that all other attack sets have specified for each sensor. If a sensor is not involved in 
any other attack sets, the sensor is returned to the default setting defined at the beginning of the 
scenario run. 
5.2.2 Send Above Priority Rule 
Another rule available to determine the fusion engine wants is the Send Above Priority 
Rule. The Send Above Priority rule allows the user to specify a minimum priority level. The 
sensors then send all alerts at or above the specified priority to the fusion engine. All sensors are 
set to the same ‘Send Above Priority rule’, and all sensors immediately send alerts to the fusion 
engine that meet the priority criteria.  A flowchart depicting the Send Above Priority Rule can be 
seen in Figure 5-7.   
 
Figure 5-7: Send Above Priority Rule Flowchart 
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5.2.3 Connectivity Revision 
This rule combines the attack tracking capabilities of the Connectivity and Priority rule 
with the frugalness of the Send Above Priority Rule. In this rule, the sensors are set to external 
monitor, internal monitor or standby rules just as in the Connectivity and Priority rule, but the 
external and internal monitor rule are modified slightly. In the Connectivity Revision rule there 
is no maximum batch size that triggers a sensor in external/internal monitor mode to send all its 
alerts to the fusion engine. Instead, alerts are only sent to the fusion engine if they are above the 
current minimum priority of the system, or if the alert is polled by an under capacity or over 
capacity rule. Due to the relatively low levels of high priority alerts, the Connectivity Revision 
rule almost always is in an under capacity state. Unlike the other main rules, when the system is 
under capacity and the Connectivity Revision rule has been chosen, the under capacity rule gives 
priority to the sensors that are part of the fusion engine wants.  Flowcharts for the external and 
internal monitor rule can be seen in Figure 5-8, while a flow chart for a sensor’s actions after the 
switch from standby to internal monitor mode can be seen in Figure 5-9.   
 
Figure 5-8: Connectivity Revision: External and Internal Monitor Rule Flowcharts 
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Figure 5-9: Connectivity Revision: Switching from Standby to Internal Monitor Mode Flowchart 
 
5.2.4 Send Everything Rule  
Another rule available to determine the fusion engine wants is the Send Everything Rule. 
Much like the name sounds, this rule tells all sensors to send all alerts immediately to the fusion 
engine. This rule was included to allow the comparison of the effectiveness of the Connectivity 
and Priority rule to other more simplistic, although often employed, sensor management 
strategies.  The flowchart of the actions a sensor takes while following the Send Everything Rule 
can be seen in Figure 5-10. 
 
Figure 5-10: Send Everything Rule Flowchart 
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5.2.5 Send Everything In Batches Rule 
 Another rule available to determine the fusion engine wants is the Send Everything in 
Batches Rule. This rule forces the sensors to batch alerts as they are received until the sensor 
collects a number of alerts equal to the specified minimum batch size. Once a full batch is 
collected by a sensor, all alerts are sent to the fusion engine.  A flowchart depicting the Send 
Everything In Batches Rule can be seen in Figure 5-11. 
 
Figure 5-11: Send Everything in Batches Rule Flowchart 
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fusion ‘wants’ to send to the fusion engine. Once the offending queue has returned to a 
predefined minimum queue threshold, the system will again follow the main rule.  
Several options are available for choosing the subset of alerts to send to the fusion engine 
including: priority sampling, edge sampling, random sampling, or increase priority threshold. 
Alternatively, the user can choose to do nothing in the over capacity situation and continue to 
send all wants to the fusion engine despite over loading the fusion engine or using too much 
bandwidth. Each of the rules that involve sampling sample alerts at a rate equal to the tightest 
constraint of the system. For example, if the system is limited by the fusion engine processing 
rate, then the constraint rate equals the processing rate of the fusion engine. If the system is 
limited by the bandwidth, then the constraint rate equals the minimum bandwidth available in the 
system. Each of the over capacity rules is discussed in detail below. 
 
5.3.1 Priority Sampling Rule 
 Every ten times the priority sampling rule is called, an initial sampling of all sensors that 
are part of the fusion engine wants is performed. As an alert is sampled from each sensor, the 
priority of the alert is recorded by the rule. After the rule samples one alert from each sensor, the 
sensor with the highest priority alert is selected to send the next alert in the sensor’s queue. The 
rule continues to select the sensor with the highest priority alert until the constraint rate has been 
reached for that second, or until no more alerts are available for sampling. In the case of a 
priority tie between sensors, the rule chooses between the tied sensors randomly.  A flowchart 
depicting the Priority Sampling Rule process is illustrated in Figure 5-12. 
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Figure 5-12: Over Capacity Priority Sampling Rule Flowchart 
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that has been waiting the longest is sent to the fusion engine. If LIFO were chosen, the most 
recent alert to arrive at the sensor is sent to the fusion engine. 
The random and cyclic sampling rules sample alerts each second at a rate equal to the 
constraint rate of the system, or until there are no remaining alerts to be sampled.  A flowchart of 
the random and cyclic over capacity sampling rules can be seen in Figure 5-13. 
 
Figure 5-13: Random and Cyclic Sampling Over Capacity Rules 
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 Similar to the random and cyclic sampling rules, the user must specify the queuing policy 
at the sensors. An alert may be requested from a sensor using highest priority, FIFO, or LIFO as 
possible queue choices. 
 
5.3.4 Increase Priority Threshold Rule 
 The increase priority threshold rule acts differently from the other available over capacity 
rules. While the other rules focus on sampling alerts from the fusion wants in order to limit the 
alerts sent to the fusion engine, the increase priority threshold rule adjusts the priority level of the 
system in order to try to reduce the alerts sent to the fusion engine.  
The increase priority threshold rule dynamically adjusts the minimum priority level 
required for an alert to be sent. If this rule were chosen, the system goes into over-capacity mode 
when the queue at the fusion or bandwidth reaches the minimum threshold level. When the 
queue reaches the minimum threshold level the priority level is increased by one point. If the 
queue were to continue to increase in size, the priority level is also increased. The trigger points 
for increasing the priority level are two queue lengths evenly spaced between the maximum 
queue length and the minimum threshold queue length. The priority level is decreased as the 
queue reduces in size. Decreasing the priority level should allow more alerts to be sent to the 
fusion engine.  The diagram in Figure 5-14 illustrates the position of each of the threshold levels. 
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Figure 5-14: Increase Priority Threshold Rule Queue Threshold Diagram 
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second, and only 20 alerts were sent to the fusion engine in the past second, the rule pulls 10 
more alerts to the fusion engine. There are three main rules available for the under capacity state: 
priority sampling, random or cyclic sampling, and do nothing. Each rule is discussed in the 
following sections. 
 
5.4.1 Priority Sampling Rule 
 This rule acts very similarly to the priority sampling rule of the over capacity state. The 
first time the system requests alerts to fill excess fusion engine capacity, the priority sampling 
rule does an initial sampling of all the sensors in the network. As an alert is sampled from each 
sensor, the priority of the alert is recorded by the rule. This initial sampling acts as a guide to 
help determine which sensor to choose next. The rule requests the next alert from the sensor that 
delivered the highest priority alert. As each alert is sent to the fusion engine, the rule records the 
alert’s priority. The rule continues to sample the sensors with the highest priority alerts until the 
excess capacity at the fusion engine is filled. If there is a tie between two or more sensors, a 
sensor is chosen randomly from among the tied sensors to send an alert. 
 As the simulation progresses there is a need, at some point, to re-sample from all the 
sensors in order to maintain a current list of priorities available at each sensor. In order to 
maintain a more accurate priority list, all the sensors are sampled once every ten times the 
priority rule is called. 
 
5.4.2 Random and Cyclic Sampling Rules 
 The random and cyclic sampling rules act very similarly to the random and cyclic rules of 
the over capacity state. The only differences between the rules in the two states is the sampling 
base, and the rate of sampling. In the under capacity state the alerts are sampled from all the 
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sensors in the network, and the sampling rate is equal to the remaining fusion capacity. See 
section 5.3.2 for a full description of the random and cyclic sampling rules.  
 
5.4.3 Do Nothing Rule 
 The do nothing rule of the under capacity state effectively ignores that the system is 
underutilizing the fusion engine. The alerts corresponding to fusion engine wants continue to be 
sent to the fusion engine, but no additional alerts are sent to the engine to fill the excess available 
capacity. 
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6 SIMULATION METHODOLOGY 
In order to effectively test the sensor management rules, a simulation environment must 
model both the cyber domain including network topology and cyber attacks, as well as the sensor 
management rules.  A Cyber Attack Simulator has been created that effectively models cyber 
networks and attacks on the networks.  The simulator allows a user to specify the topology and 
components of a computer network including the locations of sensors in the network.  Once a 
network is designed, the simulator can be used to create cyber attacks on the network.  These 
simulated cyber attacks trigger sensors in the network to produce alerts corresponding to attack 
activities.  The purpose of the Cyber Attack Simulator is to generate sensor alert datasets that are 
then used to test the effectiveness of information fusion engines at tracking cyber attacks through 
computer networks (Kistner, 2006, Costantini, 2007, Kuhl et. al. 2007). 
The Cyber Attack Simulator is an object oriented discrete event simulation implemented 
in Java.  Since the sensors were modeled as individual objects in the Cyber Attack Simulator an 
additional package was built to control the sensors during simulation runtime.  The package adds 
sensor management capabilities to the Cyber Attack Simulator so that the sensors could be 
controlled during the simulation of the cyber attacks.  In order to accurately model the sensor 
management capabilities several new classes are created to allow the modeling of an information 
fusion engine, bandwidth constraints, and the sensor management rules. 
 
6.1 Sensor Management Package 
To test the sensor management rules a sensor management package was created to 
interface with the Cyber Attack Simulator. The sensor management package controls the sensors 
during a scenario run. This new package includes extensions of existing classes such as the 
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sensor and traffic classes, as well as several new classes in order to model the fusion engine, the 
rule itself, and to facilitate control of the sensors. This section covers the sensor management 
package architecture including how the classes interact with one another, as well as how the 
sensor management package interacts with the Cyber Attack Simulator. Additionally, the details 
of the main sensor management package classes are explained.   Names of Java classes will 
appear in italics. 
   
6.1.1 Architecture Overview 
There are two main ways that the sensor management package interacts with the Cyber 
Attack Simulator. The primary interaction occurs when the rule sensors receive alerts as they are 
generated by the simulator. This interaction is seen in Figure 6-1 as the arrow for alerts pointing 
from the attack scenario class to the rule sensor class. The receipt of an alert triggers the sensor 
to follow the rule the sensor has been assigned by the rule class to determine what to do with the 
alert the sensor has received. The second interaction occurs through the simulation event table, or 
the event order class. This second interaction can be seen in Figure 6-1 as the arrows that point 
from the fusion engine traffic and bandwidth traffic classes to the attack scenario’s event order 
class. The sensor management package adds events to the scenario event table in order to control 
the processing of alerts at the fusion engine, and to determine bandwidth and resource usage in 
the network. In order to add events to the event table two extensions of the traffic class were 
created, bandwidth traffic and fusion engine traffic. Adding events to the event table allows the 
sensor management package to operate with the same simulation clock that is being used to 
generate the alerts.  
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Figure 6-1: Sensor Management Architecture 
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6.2 Sensor Management Package Class Descriptions 
The sensor management package add-on to the Cyber Attack Simulator consists of 
several extensions to existing classes as well as several new classes, and the package provides 
the primary simulation framework to test the sensor management rules. The important details of 
each of the sensor management package classes are discussed in the following sections. 
 
6.2.1 Rule Sensor Class 
The rule sensor class is an extension of the sensor class. An instance of the rule sensor 
class has all the same properties and functionality as the original sensors with additional 
properties that are used to control the action of the sensor once an alert is received. Once an alert 
arrives at a rule sensor, the rule sensor will decide what to do with the alert based on the rule the 
sensor has been assigned by the rule class. A rule sensor may send an alert to the fusion engine, 
store the alert to send later, or ignore the alert altogether.  
A rule sensor is triggered to send an alert to the fusion engine by one of two events. The 
first event is the arrival of an alert to the sensor. When an alert arrives at a rule sensor, the sensor 
is triggered to process the alert according to the sensor’s current rule setting. The current rule 
may cause alerts to be sent to the fusion engine. The second event is a pull mechanism by which 
the rule class may sample alerts available at a sensor and tell a sensor to send a specific alert to 
the fusion engine.  
An instance of a rule sensor keeps track of statistics important to the overall performance 
of a rule. These statistics include: the number of alerts received, the number of alerts sent to the 
fusion engine, the number of real alerts received, the number of noise alerts received, the number 
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of alerts received while the sensor was in standby mode, and the time in queue a real alert waits 
at a sensor before being sent to the fusion engine. 
The rule sensors have the ability to keep track of all the alerts received and all the alerts 
sent to the fusion engine. At the end of a simulation run, two files can be created for each sensor, 
one file contains a list of all the alerts generated by that sensor while the second file creates a list 
of all the alerts sent to the fusion engine. When running scenarios that may generate large 
numbers of alerts, the user may choose to disable the saving of alerts to allow the simulation to 
run faster as well as avoid memory problems. The pertinent statistics with regards to rule 
performance are saved regardless of whether the alerts are saved or not.  
 
6.2.2 Rule Class 
The rule class is a static class that receives information from the fusion engine and the 
constraints of the network in order to determine what rule each sensor should have and what 
sampling plan, if any, should be activated in the network. The rule class has three main 
responsibilities. The first responsibility is to set up the sensors by assigning the sensors their 
starting rule, or default rule, based on the overall rule schema chosen by the user. The second 
responsibility is to dynamically assign rules to each sensor based on the progression of attacks in 
the network and the chosen rule schema. The third responsibility is to sample alerts from sensors 
as the need arises. Detailed information on the actual rules that the rule class uses is in the 
previous section. 
The rule class stores information on the attacks that are in progress in attack sets. For 
each attack in progress, the rule class maintains a list of the machines involved in the attack, as 
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well as the settings of all sensors involved in the attack. These attack sets are used to reset 
sensors in the network after an attack has been completed.  
The rule class has several parameters that can be adjusted by the user before each run. 
The parameters include the rules that will be used during the run, the maximum batch size 
allowed at a sensor, the bit size of an alert, whether or not the alerts for a scenario should be 
saved by the sensors, and minimum and maximum fusion engine queue size thresholds. 
 
6.2.3 Sensor Director Class 
The sensor director, like the rule class, is a static class. The sensor director is primarily 
responsible for changing the rule that each sensor is following based on the assignments made by 
the rule class. The sensor director is the class that interacts with the sensors in order to change 
their settings. A secondary responsibility of the sensor director is to reset all statistic collection 
fields at the beginning of a new simulation run.  
 
6.2.4 Fusion Engine and Fusion Engine Traffic Classes 
The fusion engine class represents an information fusion engine that works with 100% 
accuracy. An instance of the fusion engine class maintains a queue of alerts that need to be 
processed. As a fusion engine processes an alert, the fusion engine first determines if the alert is 
real or noise. A real alert is an alert that was created as a result of an attack in the attack scenario. 
A noise alert is a randomly generated alert that was not caused by an attack in the attack 
scenario. If the alert is real, the alert must then be matched to an existing attack track. If the alert 
does not belong to an existing attack track, then a new attack track is created. The real alert, as 
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well as the target machine of the alert, and the time of the original alert are sent to the rule class 
to be processed.  
One important attribute of the fusion engine class is the processing rate. The processing 
rate of the fusion engine is specified in alerts per second and can be controlled by the user at 
runtime. The processing rate of the fusion engine determines how fast alerts are processed in the 
queue. If the queue at the fusion engine becomes too long then the rule class is notified. The 
rules followed by the sensors as well as any sampling procedures may be modified until the 
queue at the fusion engine goes down to a more desirable level. 
As the fusion engine processes alerts additional fusion engine traffic objects are added to 
the attack scenario event table. This allows the fusion engine to process the alerts as the 
simulation is running. After an alert has been processed, the fusion engine will add the next 
traffic step to the event table if there is an alert waiting in the fusion queue. 
 
6.2.5 Bandwidth Traffic and Bandwidth Stats Classes 
The bandwidth traffic class is used to put a reoccurring event in the event table. This 
event recalculates the average and max bandwidth used per network link each second of the 
simulation. The bandwidth stats class is a static class in charge of actually performing the 
bandwidth calculations. Each time the bandwidth stats class recalculates the bandwidth 
performance measures, the class also checks the state of the system to determine if the system is 
over capacity or under capacity.  
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6.3 Using the Sensor Management Package and Cyber Attack Simulator 
There are several new interface components that a user encounters when using the Cyber 
Attack Simulator with the sensor management package. The new interfaces allow a user to turn 
on the sensor management functionality, place a fusion engine in the network, edit the fusion 
engine’s properties, and set up sensor rules. The new interface features are discussed below. 
 
6.3.1 Starting the Sensor Management Package 
The Java Cyber Attack Simulator does not automatically use the Sensor Management 
Package. The Sensor Management Package must be turned on when a network is created. To 
turn on the Sensor Management Package click the checkbox next to “Sensor Management 
Functionality” in the New Network form as pictured in Figure 6-2.  
 
Figure 6-2:Sensor Management Checkbox on New Network Form 
 
 Turning on the Sensor Management Package adds a new menu called “Fusion” to the 
menu bar, and a new button called “Place Fusion Engine” next to the other network buttons. The 
Fusion menu and the “Place Fusion Engine” button can be seen in Figure 6-3. 
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Figure 6-3: Sensor Management Features 
 
6.3.2 Editing the Fusion Engine 
 When creating a network using the Sensor Management Package, an additional step must 
be taken to place the fusion engine somewhere in the network. Placing the fusion engine can be 
done by clicking the “Place Fusion Engine” button, or selecting “Fusion Engine Properties” from 
the Fusion menu. A form appears as in Figure 6-4.  
 
Figure 6-4: Fusion Engine Properties Form 
 
 The fusion engine can be placed on any of the connectors in the network by choosing the 
desired connector in the fusion location drop down menu. In addition to specifying the fusion 
engine location, this form can be used to update the fusion engine processing rate. Once the 
Fusion Menu Place Fusion Engine Button 
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fusion engine has been added to the network, the engine appears in the network frame as pictured 
in Figure 6-5. 
 
Figure 6-5: Cyber Network With Fusion Engine 
 
 
6.3.3 Choosing the Sensor Management Rules 
 The user has the ability to set up the sensor management rules using the “Rule 
Properties” form. The “Rule Properties” form is accessed through the Fusion menu and is seen in 
Figure 6-6. This form is used to choose the rule that will be applied in each of the system states 
as well as to specify supporting information for each rule that is chosen. For the main fusion 
wants rule, the user must choose a rule, and may additionally need to specify the minimum alert 
priority that can be sent to the fusion engine as well as the maximum batch size of alerts allowed 
at a sensor. Depending on the under capacity rule chosen, the user may need to specify the 
queuing priority. When choosing the over capacity rule the user again may need to specify the 
queuing priority depending on what rule is chosen, and additionally the user needs to specify the 
maximum and minimum queue lengths at the fusion engine. These queue lengths are used to 
evaluate the state of the system.  
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 The Rule Properties form is also used to specify whether the alerts generated by each 
sensor should be saved. The default setting is that sensor alerts are not saved. Not saving the 
sensor alerts allows the simulation to run much faster. If the user needs the alerts generated at 
each sensor, the “Save Alerts” check box can be checked and the alerts are automatically saved 
by the program at the end of each scenario run. 
 
Figure 6-6: Rule Properties Form 
 
6.3.4 Viewing Results 
When a scenario is run with the sensor management package in use, a results page 
appears on the screen at the end of the scenario. This results page provides a summary of the 
scenario. A text file is created that is saved in the network’s results folder. This text file can be 
opened in Excel and has all the summary information, plus additional information on bandwidth 
use for each link in the system and the number of alerts processed versus total alerts generated 
for each attack in the scenario. 
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7 A STUDY OF EVENT BASED DISPATCHING RULES  
This section outlines the design of the experiment used to test the effectiveness of the 
various sensor management rules developed. First, an overview of the entire experiment will be 
discussed, followed by a detailed description of the individual experimental factors and the 
performance measures recorded for analysis. 
 
7.1 Methodology 
The purpose of this experiment is two-fold. The first purpose is to identify a robust sensor 
management strategy that performs well for a variety of performance measures and network 
configurations. The second purpose is to identify characteristics of a computer network that may 
affect the performance of sensor management rules. This goal of this experiment is to identify 
rules that both perform well for a comprehensive set of performance measures and perform 
robustly across a variety of network configurations. 
  
7.1.1 Experimental Design 
In order for a sensor management strategy to be considered useful, the strategy should 
work consistently and effectively for a variety of network configurations and attack patterns. 
Networks can differ in many ways including the overall layout of the network or network 
topology, the number of machines or size of the network, and the overall volume of traffic and 
noise generated within the network. In this experiment the network topology, the number of 
computers, and the alert rate of the network are chosen as the experimental factors along with all 
the practical rule combinations.  
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Network topology may be a significant factor in the performance of the connectivity 
based rules. As the number of layers in the network increases, the performance of the 
connectivity based rules could improve over global network rules such as the Send Everything 
Rule. As the number of layers in a network increases, the connectivity rules have more 
opportunities to manipulate the sensor settings as an attack is tracked through the network. 
Multiple network layers provide natural protective layers to sensors deeper within the network. 
The sensors on the unthreatened network machines can be kept in standby mode, thereby 
preventing unwanted noise sent to the fusion engine. When there are fewer layers, more 
computers are vulnerable to attack, so the connectivity rules could have little advantage over the 
global rules. Three different network topologies are tested, each with increasing numbers of 
layers within the networks: a one layer network, three layer network, and five layer network. 
These networks are pictured and discussed in the Test Networks section below. 
The number of computers in the network may affect the performance of some of the 
rules, particularly the rules involving cyclic and random sampling. As the number of machines in 
the network increases, so may the number of sensors. With more sensors in the network, when 
the sensors are polled in a cyclic manner, the time taken to return to each sensor may increase, 
and this increase in polling interval may increase the time real alerts spend waiting at a sensor 
before they are sent to the fusion engine for processing. Likewise, an increase in the number of 
sensors decreases the chance that a certain sensor is polled during the random polling of sensors. 
A sensor that is not polled for an extensive period of time may lead to a high wait time for alerts 
at these sensors. For each of the three network topologies created, there is a small network and a 
large network version. The small network contains 250 machines distributed evenly throughout 
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the subnets, while the large version has 1000 machines distributed evenly throughout the 
network subnets. 
The third test factor that may affect the performance of the sensor management rules is 
the volume of alerts in the system with respect to the capacity of the fusion engine. If the rate of 
alerts in the network is significantly less than the capacity of the fusion engine then a sensor 
management strategy is not even necessary because the fusion engine can easily process all alerts 
in the system in a timely manner. Sensor management strategies become important as the rate of 
alerts in the network approaches or exceeds the processing rate of alerts at the fusion engine. The 
rules that effectively limit the number of alerts sent to the fusion engine to less than or equal to 
the fusion engine processing rate will work well when the rate of alerts arriving exceeds the 
capacity of the fusion engine. Rules that ignore the capacity of the fusion engine may develop 
large queues at the engine, and the fusion engine may not be able to process real alerts in a 
timely manner. Two different alert levels are used in this experiment, a low level and a high 
level. The low level corresponds to roughly 100% of the fusion engine capacity while the high 
level corresponds to 115% of the fusion engine capacity.  
The final factor in this experiment is all the practical combinations of the developed 
rules. For each simulation run, a Main Rule, Under Capacity Rule and Over Capacity Rule were 
chosen. Table 7-1 summarizes the available combinations for each of the Main Rules. There are 
a total of 58 rule combinations. An initial set of all 58 rule combinations is run.  From the initial 
set, a subset of the rules is chosen for analysis.  The subset of rules contains all rules whose 
performance is significantly different from another rule.   
There are several parameters that these rules require.  For every scenario the maximum 
fusion engine queue is set to 60 seconds, while the threshold queue length is set to 6 seconds. 
 59 
The fusion engine capacity is set to 100 alerts per second in each scenario. For every rule that 
requires batching, a batch size of 10 alerts is used. For every rule that requires a queue choice of 
FIFO, LIFO or highest priority, the highest priority rule is chosen. For rules that require the 
specification of a minimum priority, a priority level of 1 is chosen. 
 
  
Table 7-1: Experiment Rule Combinations 
Main Rule Under Capacity Rules Over Capacity Rules Combinations 
Connectivity and 
Priority (CP) 
 
Do Nothing (DN) 
Random Sampling (RS) 
Cyclic Sampling (CS) 
Priority Sampling (PS) 
Do Nothing (DN) 
Edge Sampling (ES) 
Random Sampling (RS) 
Priority Sampling (PS) 
Increase Priority 
Threshold (IPT) 
20 
 
Connectivity 
Revision (CR) 
Random Sampling 
Cyclic Sampling 
Priority Sampling 
Do Nothing 
Edge Sampling 
Random Sampling 
Priority Sampling 
Increase Priority 
Threshold 
15 
 
Send Everything in 
Batches (SEB) 
Do Nothing 
Random Sampling 
Cyclic Sampling 
Priority Sampling 
Do Nothing 
Random Sampling 
Priority Sampling 
Increase Priority 
Threshold 
16 
Send Everything 
(SE) 
 
Do Nothing Do Nothing 
Random Sampling 
Priority Sampling 
Increase Priority 
Threshold 
4 
Send Above Priority 
(SAP) 
Random Sampling 
Cyclic Sampling 
Priority Sampling 
Do Nothing 
3 
 TOTAL 58 
 
 
A summary of the experimental factors and levels can be seen in Table 7-2. Four 
replications of a test scenario are completed for each set of conditions. There are a total of  2784 
experimental runs.  
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Table 7-2: Experiment Factor Summary 
Factors Levels 
Network Topology (Layers) 1, 3, 5  
Network Size (Machines) 250, 1000  
Alert Rate (% of Fusion Capacity) 100, 115 
Rules 58 Combinations (See Table 7-1) 
 
 
7.1.2 Test Networks 
For security reasons, organizations do not typically make their network topologies 
available to the public. This experiment uses three network topologies designed to represent 
increasingly complicated network structures that one may encounter in industry. Although not 
actual networks, the networks are representative of various network structures encountered in 
practice. The test networks are referred to by their number of subnet layers and include a one, 
three, and five layer network. 
The one layer network contains three servers with external access, and five subnets 
accessible from the three servers. Once a server is compromised all the computers in the one 
layer network become vulnerable to attack. In the small version of the single layer network each 
subnet contains roughly 49 computers. In the large version of the single layer network each 
subnet contains 199 computers. The fusion engine is arbitrarily located on connector 6. The 
layout of the one layer network can be seen in Figure 7-1. 
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Figure 7-1: One Layer Network Topology 
 
The three layer network provides a test framework where target machines can be several 
layers deep in the network. The three layer network contains two main branches accessible from 
three servers with external access. Each branch of the network contains three layers of subnets, 
for a total of six subnets. The small version of the three layer network contains roughly 41 
computers in each subnet, while the large version contained 84 computers per subnet. The fusion 
engine resides deep within the network on connector 7. The three layer network can be seen in 
Figure 7-2.  
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Figure 7-2: Three Layer Network Topology 
 
The branching and multiple layers of the five layer network was designed to represent a 
complicated network structure that could be found in a large government or industry 
organization. The five layer network contains many branches and is best introduced by referring 
the reader to Figure 7-3. The five layer network contains four main branches accessible from 
three external servers. There are a total of 20 subnets. In the small five layer network each subnet 
contains roughly 12 computers, while in the large version of the network each subnet contains 49 
computers. The fusion engine resides deep within the network on connector 21.  
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Figure 7-3: Five Layer Network Topology 
 
7.1.3 Test Scenario and Noise Traffic 
A test scenario is developed to create a variety of attack conditions that may occur during 
any given day of network monitoring. The scenario is 12 hours in length and contains ten unique 
attacks. Once the attacks are complete the scenario runs for an additional 7 minutes. The attacks 
are dispersed throughout the day so that there are periods of time with no attacks in progress, one 
attack in progress, or several attacks in progress at the same time. A scenario timeline with the 
details of each attack can be seen in Figure 7-7. This scenario is used for all three networks with 
the exception that the target machines for each attack are different for each of the networks. The 
target subnet for each of the attacks in each of the different networks can be seen in Figures 7-4 
through 7-6.  
In addition to the attacks in the scenario, the scenario also has a set of noise parameters. 
The noise contains 98% reconnaissance alerts, 1% intrusion alerts, and 1% escalation alerts. The 
noise rate of the scenario is manipulated in order to reach the desired overall network alert rates. 
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For an alert rate of 100% of the fusion engine capacity, the noise rate is set at 175,000 alerts per 
hour. This corresponds to a noise alert to real alert ratio of roughly 45:1. For an alert rate of 
115% of the fusion engine capacity, the noise rate is set to 200,000 alerts per hour. The higher 
rate corresponds to a noise alert to real alert ratio of roughly 55:1. The fusion engine capacity is 
set to 100 alerts per second in all network configurations. 
 
 
Figure 7-4: One Layer Network Attack Locations 
 
 
 
Figure 7-5: Three Layer Network Attack Locations 
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Figure 7-6: Five Layer Network Attack Locations 
 
The Cyber Attack Simulator uses unique random number streams to generate the attack 
steps for each attack and the noise in each scenario. In order to make four replications of each 
network configuration and rule combination, four different seeds are chosen for the random 
number generator. Each seed produces a different set of attacks with the parameters specified in 
Figure 7-7 and a different set of noise alerts. The random seeds chosen are 456, 57913, 135790, 
and 8755241.  
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Start Time:     620
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Goal:       Pilfering
Start
End ~ 727
12 Hour Attack Scenario
 
Figure 7-7: Attack Scenario Time Line 
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7.1.4 Performance Measures 
 Evaluating the performance of a set of rules requires looking at the rule performance 
from a variety of perspectives. Looking at several different performance measures is important 
because some rules may perform well for a subset of performance measures, but very poorly for 
others. Analyzing multiple performance measures highlights rules that perform well for many if 
not all of the measures.  
The performance measures that are recorded for each scenario replication include: 
1. Percentage of all real alerts processed at the fusion engine by the end of the 
scenario; 
2. Percentage of all noise alerts processed at the fusion engine; 
3. Average percentage of alerts per attack processed at the fusion engine; 
4. Standard deviation of percentage of alerts per attack processed at the fusion 
engine; 
5. Average total time a real alert spends in the system; and 
6. Average bandwidth used on the fusion engine link. 
A good rule should send a high percentage of the real alerts to the fusion engine for 
processing. The percentage of all real alerts processed at the fusion engine performance measure 
applies only to those alerts that are processed by the end of the scenario. For example, a rule may 
send nearly all of the real alerts to the fusion engine, but due to a queue build up at the fusion 
engine, not all of the real alerts may be processed by the end of the scenario.  
The percentage of all noise alerts processed at the fusion engine measures the amount of 
noise processed at the engine in relation to the total noise in the system. Processing less noise 
alerts in exchange for processing more real alerts could indicate that a rule is performing well. 
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During the scenario run, the number of alerts generated for each attack is tracked along 
with the number of alerts sent to the fusion engine for each attack. These two measurements 
allow for the calculation of the percentage of alerts processed for each attack. The average 
percentage of alerts processed per attack gives an indication of the thoroughness of each rule set 
at tracking the attacks. The standard deviation of the percentage of alerts processed per attack 
gives an indication of the ability of a rule set to track all attacks evenly. A rule performing well 
should have a high average percentage of alerts processed per attack and a low standard 
deviation of the percentage of alerts processed per attack.  
The time a real alert spends in the system is a critical performance measure of the rules. 
The time a real alert spends in the system should be small. The fusion engine should be able to 
track attacks in the network in near real time, so that the system administrator or threat 
assessment tools have an adequate amount to time to react to the attacks on the network while 
the attacks are still in progress. 
Finally, the amount of bandwidth used by a sensor management rule should not be 
excessive. The amount of bandwidth used by two similarly performing rules may serve as a way 
to choose between the two rules. 
 
7.2 Results 
 
A summary of the results of the designed experiment are presented in this section. Once 
all the results were gathered an observation was made that either the under capacity or the over 
capacity rule played a dominant role in the performance of each of the main rules. For the 
Connectivity Revision rule and the Send Above Priority rule the under capacity rule was the 
dominant factor in the rule’s performance. For example, for the Connectivity and Priority rule, 
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all rule combinations that contained cyclic sampling as the under capacity rule performed 
similarly. For the Send Everything In Batches and Connectivity and Priority rules the over 
capacity rule acted as the dominant rule. Due to the dominance of one of the under or over 
capacity rules, only a subset of the entire rule set tested is shown and discussed in this section. 
For the complete data set see Appendix II. The rules that are the focus of the rest of the results 
are summarized in Table 7-3. The rules are listed in order of their performance for the time a real 
alert spends in the system performance measure; the best performing rule is listed first.  
Table 7-3: Rule Set Used in Results Discussion 
Rule 
Abbreviations Main Rule 
Under      
Capacity Rule Over Capacity Rule 
CR-CS-DN Connectivity Revision   Cyclic Sampling   Do Nothing 
SAP-CS-DN Send Above Priority   Cyclic Sampling   Do Nothing 
SAP-RS-DN Send Above Priority   Random Sampling  Do Nothing 
SAP-PS-DN Send Above Priority   Priority Sampling  Do Nothing 
CR-RS-DN Connectivity Revision   Random Sampling  Do Nothing 
CR-PS-PS Connectivity Revision   Priority Sampling  Priority Sampling 
CR-PS-DN Connectivity Revision   Priority Sampling  Do Nothing 
CP-DN-RS Connectivity and Priority   Do Nothing   Random Sampling 
CP-DN-ES  Connectivity and Priority   Do Nothing   Edge Sampling 
SE-DN-RS Send Everything   Do Nothing   Random Sampling 
SEB-DN-RS Send Everything Batches   Do Nothing   Random Sampling 
CP-DN-PS Connectivity and Priority   Do Nothing   Priority Sampling 
CP-DN-DN Connectivity and Priority   Do Nothing   Do Nothing 
SE-DN-IPT Send Everything   Do Nothing   Increase Priority Threshold 
SEB-DN-IPT Send Everything in Batches  Do Nothing   Increase Priority Threshold 
SE-DN-DN Send Everything   Do Nothing   Do Nothing 
SEB-DN-DN Send Everything in Batches  Do Nothing   Do Nothing 
SEB-DN-PS Send Everything in Batches  Do Nothing   Priority Sampling 
SE-DN-PS Send Everything   Do Nothing   Priority Sampling 
CP-DN-IPT Connectivity and Priority   Do Nothing   Increase Priority Threshold 
 
 
 In Table 7-4, is a summary of the results showing the average performance of each rule 
over all of the network configurations. The rules are listed in the table in order of increasing 
average total time real alerts spend in the system before processing. For each performance 
measure the best performing rules are outlined in bold while the worst performing rules are 
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shaded in light gray. Tables 7-5 through 7-7 display the results of the aggregated rule 
performance for each of the network factors: topology, alert rate, and size. Following the 
summary tables are graphs of each performance measure. For each performance measure graph 
the rules are listed in the same order as in Table 7-4 to provide consistency between graphs. Each 
performance measure is discussed following their respective graphs. 
Table 7-4: Average Rule Performance Over All Network Configurations and Alert Rates 
Rule 
Avg. Time 
to Process 
Real Alerts 
(mins) 
Real 
Alerts 
Processed
(%) 
Noise 
Alerts 
Processed
(%) 
Avg % of 
Alerts per 
Attack 
(%) 
Std Dev of 
% of Alerts 
per Attack 
(%) 
Avg 
Bandwidth 
(Mbs) 
CR-CS-DN 0.01 97.4 92.3 97.8 2.0 0.1600
SAP-CS-DN 0.01 97.5 92.5 98.0 2.0 0.1600
SAP-RS-DN 0.01 97.5 92.5 98.0 2.0 0.1600
SAP-PS-DN 0.03 97.6 92.5 98.0 1.9 0.1600
CR-RS-DN 0.03 97.5 92.3 98.0 2.0 0.1600
CR-PS-PS 0.04 97.1 87.0 97.2 2.5 0.1510
CR-PS-DN 0.09 97.1 87.1 97.2 2.4 0.1512
CP-DN-RS 8.83 95.4 87.8 98.1 4.8 0.1551
CP-DN-ES  15.27 89.8 88.2 96.3 9.8 0.1593
SE-DN-RS 16.42 83.1 92.5 92.6 16.5 0.1688
SEB-DN-RS 19.16 95.7 92.5 97.4 3.8 0.1637
CP-DN-PS 26.39 83.8 88.9 93.0 15.3 0.1637
CP-DN-DN 28.83 83.1 89.2 92.5 16.3 0.1651
SE-DN-IPT 30.87 69.4 92.7 79.0 15.0 0.1645
SEB-DN-IPT 31.84 70.4 92.9 79.5 14.2 0.1653
SE-DN-DN 36.22 80.9 92.5 90.9 19.9 0.1740
SEB-DN-DN 36.52 80.7 92.7 91.0 19.6 0.1734
SEB-DN-PS 36.64 80.6 92.7 91.5 19.0 0.1721
SE-DN-PS 37.70 80.2 92.5 90.8 20.1 0.1733
CP-DN-IPT 37.81 64.3 89.9 74.5 16.5 0.1592
Key   
 Best performing rules  
 Worst performing rules  
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Table 7-5: Average Performance Per Topology 
Topology 
Avg. Time 
to Process 
Real Alerts 
(mins) 
Real 
Alerts 
Processed
(%) 
Noise 
Alerts 
Processed
(%) 
Avg % of 
Alerts per 
Attack 
(%) 
Std Dev of 
% of Alerts 
per Attack 
(%) 
Avg 
Bandwidth 
(Mbs) 
1 Layer 16.87 87.3 92.3 93.5 10.4 0.1638
3 Layer 18.85 86.1 90.9 92.4 10.4 0.1634
5 Layer 18.69 87.6 90.0 91.9 10.0 0.1617
 
 
Table 7-6: Average Performance Per Alert Rate 
Alert Rate 
Avg. Time 
to Process 
Real Alerts 
(mins) 
Real 
Alerts 
Processed
(%) 
Noise 
Alerts 
Processed
(%) 
Avg % of 
Alerts per 
Attack 
(%) 
Std Dev of 
% of Alerts 
per Attack 
(%) 
Avg 
Bandwidth 
(Mbs) 
100% 3.77 96.9 96.6 98.3 2.6 0.1577
115% 32.51 77.0 85.6 86.8 17.9 0.1683
 
 
Table 7-7: Average Performance Per Number of Machines 
Machines 
Avg. Time 
to Process 
Real Alerts 
(mins) 
Real 
Alerts 
Processed
(%) 
Noise 
Alerts 
Processed
(%) 
Avg % of 
Alerts per 
Attack 
(%) 
Std Dev of 
% of Alerts 
per Attack 
(%) 
Avg 
Bandwidth 
(Mbs) 
250 17.74 87.4 90.9 92.7 10.2 0.1630
1000 18.53 86.5 91.3 92.4 10.3 0.1629
 
As can be seen in the graph of Figure 7-8, the average time to process alerts had a large 
range of values, ranging from under 0.1 minutes for the best performing rules to well over 35 
minutes for the worst performing rules. The Send Above Priority rules and the Connectivity 
Revision rules had the best average time performance. In comparison to the Send Above Priority 
rules and the Connectivity Revision rules all other rules performed relatively poorly for the 
average time to process real alerts performance measure. 
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Figure 7-8: Average Time to Process Real Alerts by Rule 
 
Figure 7-9 illustrates that the Connectivity Revision rules and the Send Above Priority 
rules also performed well for the average percentage of real alerts processed performance 
measure. The Connectivity Revision and Send Above Priority rules were both able to process 
over 97% of all real alerts generated. The closest rivals to the top rules were the Send Everything 
In Batches rule coupled with a random sampling over capacity rule and the Connectivity and 
Priority rule coupled with a random sampling over capacity rule; the SEB-DN-RS and CP-DN-
RS rules processed 95.7% and 95.4% of real alerts respectively. Rules utilizing the increase 
priority threshold over capacity rule performed poorly for the average percentage of real alerts 
processed performance measure, with no rule combination using the IPT rule processing more 
than 70.4% of real alerts.  
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 Observing the percentage of noise alerts processed in conjunction with the percentage of 
real alerts processed, as in Figure 7-9, provides some perspective to the data. The Connectivity 
Revision rule with the priority sampling under capacity rule, CR-PS-DN, did a particularly good 
job of processing a high volume of real alerts, 97.1% on average, and a relatively low volume of 
noise alerts, 87.1% on average. The rules utilizing the increase priority threshold over capacity 
rule processed a high volume of noise alerts, while processing a relatively low volume of real 
alerts compared to the other rules tested.  
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Figure 7-9: Average Percentage of Real and Noise Alerts Processed By Rule 
  
 The average percentage of alerts per attack provides a measure of how capable a rule is at 
providing data to the fusion engine on multiple attacks at a time. As can be seen above in Figure 
7-10, the Connectivity Revision and Send Above Priority rules, along with the CP-DN-RS rule 
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performed very well for this performance measure, with each rule processing over 97% of each 
attack in the scenario run. In contrast, the increase priority threshold rules processed on average 
only 80% of each attack. 
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Figure 7-10: Average Percentage of Alerts Per Attack By Rule 
  
  While processing a high percentage of each attack is important, another important 
objective is to process each attack evenly. The ability of a rule to track each attack evenly is 
indicated by the standard deviation of the percentage of alerts processed per attack. Figure 7-11 
above illustrates that the Send Above Priority rules and the Connectivity Revision rules all had 
much lower average standard deviations than the other rules. The Send Above Priority rule with 
the priority sampling under capacity rule had the lowest average standard deviation of only 1.8%. 
The SE-DN-DN and the SEB-DN-DN rules performed relatively poorly with an average 
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standard deviation of nearly 20%. A high average standard deviation means that for each 
scenario the SE-DN-DN and the SEB-DN-DN rules tracked some attacks well, while at the same 
time processing very few alerts from other attacks. 
Average Standard Deviation of Percentage of Alerts per Attack
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Figure 7-11: Standard Deviation of Percentage of Alerts per Attack By Rule 
  
The amount of bandwidth used is largely related to the amount of data sent to the fusion 
engine. The CR-PS-DN rule, which typically sent the least amount of data to the fusion engine 
had the lowest bandwidth use. The rules that sent everything including the SE-DN-DN and the 
SEB-DN-DN had the highest bandwidth use. The Connectivity Revision and the Send Above 
Priority rules all had bandwidth use close to 0.16 Mbs, which corresponds to sending 100 alerts 
per second to the fusion engine. 
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Figure 7-12: Average Bandwidth Used By Alert Traffic By Rule 
 
7.3 Analysis of Results 
This section contains a statistical analysis of the results in order to better understand a 
rule’s overall performance.  Looking only at the averages of performance measures over all the 
runs does not necessarily give an accurate picture of rule performance. For this reason, an 
additional analysis of variance was performed for each performance measure in order to 
determine if the rule, network topology, alert rate, number of machines in the network, or any 
two way interactions with the rule had a significant effect on that performance measure. The 
results of each analysis of variance are presented below followed by a short discussion of each 
one. A significance level of 0.05 was used to test for significance.  
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When performing an analysis of variance the data that is analyzed must be normally 
distributed in order for the ANOVA to be valid. A residual analysis has been performed along 
with each analysis of variance to ensure that the data is normally distributed. For all of the data 
sets none of the normality assumptions are violated. A representative residual plot is presented in 
Figure 7-13, all of the residual plots looked similar to the one presented. The data in the normal 
probability plot is nearly linear, indicating the data is normal. The histogram of residuals presents 
a nice bell shape which is another indication that the data is normal. The residuals versus fitted 
values plot has data evenly distributed on either side of the 0.0 line, indicating that there was no 
bias in the data at high or low values. Since the data is run on a computer, the order the 
experiments are run does not make any difference in the outcome of the experiment, therefore 
the residuals versus the order of the data is not an important plot for this particular experiment. 
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Figure 7-13: Representative Residual Plot 
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7.3.1 Average Total Time to Process Real Alert 
The analysis of variance, shown in Table 7-8, indicates that the rule, topology, and alert 
rate all have a significant affect on the average total time to process a real alert. There is also a 
significant interaction effect between the rule and the topology, and the rule and the alert rate. 
The number of machines in the network does not have a significant effect on the time to process 
a real alert, nor is there an interaction effect between the rule and the number of machines. This 
is a significant observation because a network administrator could feel free to increase the 
number of machines in his network without needing to worry about the affect the extra machines 
would have on his sensor management strategy. 
The alert rate factor has the highest F statistic which suggests that the alert rate plays the 
largest role in the total time to process a real alert. This observation corresponds closely to 
common queuing applications. As the rate of entities arriving to a queue increases, the length of 
the queue, and likewise the waiting time, also increase. As the rate of alerts in the network 
increases, some of the rules, such as the Send Everything rule, send more alerts to the fusion 
engine, thereby increasing the length of the fusion engine’s queue and causing longer processing 
times. In contrast to increasing alerts sent to the fusion engine, some rules, such as the 
Connectivity and Priority rules, cause alerts to wait at sensors longer before sending them to the 
fusion engine for processing, also causing an increase in the amount of time a real alert spends in 
the system. 
 The ANOVA results of Table 7-8 suggest that the rule chosen has a significant affect on 
the total time to process a real alert. A p-value of 0.00 for the rule factor means that at least one 
of the rules performs significantly different from the others. A Tukey Test can be performed to 
determine which rules, if any, perform statistically different from one another. The results of a 
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Tukey Test on the mean time to process a real alert can be seen in Table 7-8. The Tukey Test 
indicates that the Send Above Priority and the Connectivity Revision rules perform statistically 
different from the remaining rules, and also perform significantly better than the remaining rules. 
 
Table 7-8:ANOVA and Tukey Results for Average Total Time to Process Real Alerts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P 
Rule 19 225798.4 225757 11881.9 336.35 0.000
Topology 2 775.4 777.1 388.6 11.00 0.000
AlertRate 1 198276.9 198306.1 198306.1 5613.53 0.000
Machines 1 149.7 151.1 151.1 4.28 0.039
Rule*Topology 38 6875.9 6791.6 178.7 5.06 0.000
Rule*AlertRate 19 139198.6 139199.9 7326.3 207.39 0.000
Rule*Machines 19 527.1 527.1 27.7 0.79 0.726
Error 860 30380.7 30380.7 35.3   
Total 959 601982.7     
Rule 
Time 
(mins) Significance 
CR-CS-DN 0.01             
SAP-CS-DN 0.01             
SAP-RS-DN 0.01             
CR-RS-DN 0.03             
SAP-PS-DN 0.03             
CR-PS-DN 0.04             
CR-PS-PS 0.04             
CP-DN-RS 8.83             
CP-DN-ES 15.27             
SE-DN-RS 16.42             
SEB-DN-RS 19.16             
CP-DN-PS 26.39             
CP-DN-DN 28.83             
SE-DN-IPT 30.87             
SEB-DN-IPT 31.85             
SE-DN-DN 36.22             
SEB-DN-DN 36.52             
SEB-DN-PS 36.64             
SE-DN-PS 37.70             
CP-DN-IPT 37.81             
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An additional analysis of variance was performed on the top performing rules to 
determine if the alert rate and topology affects these rules, and additionally to determine if there 
are any significant differences between the top rules. The analysis of variance and Tukey results 
are shown in Table 7-9. The ANOVA on the Connectivity Revision and Send Above Priority 
Rules indicates that the rule and network topology have a significant affect on the time to process 
real alerts for the top performing rules. The alert rate, however, is not a significant factor for the 
Connectivity Revision and Send Above Priority rules as indicated by the high p-value of 0.356. 
The Tukey Test shows that the Send Above Priority rules and the CR-CS-DN rule are in the top 
performing significance group.  
Table 7-9: ANOVA and Tukey Results for Top Performing Total Time in System Rules 
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P 
Rule 6 0.0548 0.0550 0.0092 8.130 0.000
Topology 2 0.0229 0.0227 0.0114 10.070 0.000
AlertRate 1 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.820 0.367
Machines 1 0.0006 0.0005 0.0005 0.490 0.486
Rule*Topology 12 0.0425 0.0424 0.0035 3.130 0.000
Rule*AlertRate 6 0.0309 0.0309 0.0052 4.570 0.000
Rule*Machines 6 0.0006 0.0006 0.0001 0.080 0.998
Error 301 0.3395 0.3395 0.0011   
Total 335 0.4927     
 
Rule 
Total Time 
(mins) Sig 
CR-CS-DN 0.01    
SAP-CS-DN 0.01    
SAP-RS-DN 0.01    
SAP-PS-DN 0.03    
CR-RS-DN 0.03    
CR-PS-PS 0.04    
CR-PS-DN 0.04    
 
 The average time to process real alerts performance measure highlights the ability of the 
Send Above Priority and Connectivity Revision rules to work well under a variety of conditions. 
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Unlike the remaining rules tested, these rules are not affected by the increase in alert rate and 
continue to have the same responsive performance even at the higher alert rate. Additionally, 
although these rules are significantly affected by the topology of the network, their average time 
to process a real alert is so small to begin with that the increase in time may not be of practical 
significance.  
 
7.3.2 Percentage of Real Alerts Processed 
The analysis of variance results for the percentage of real alerts processed can be seen in 
Table 7-10. The percentage of real alerts processed is affected by the rule chosen as well as the 
alert rate. The number of machines in the network and network topology do not have a 
significant affect on the percentage of alerts processed, however, the interaction between the rule 
chosen and the network topology does have a significant effect on the percentage of real alerts 
processed. Additionally, there was a significant interaction effect between the rule chosen and 
the alert rate of the system, indicated by the 0.000 p-value.  
The single largest factor affecting the percentage of real alerts processed was the alert 
rate. This is not a surprising result because in order to reach the higher alert rate, the amount of 
noise in the system was increased. For rules that do not distinguish well between noise and real 
alerts, such as the Send Everything rule, more noise alerts are processed at the higher alert rate, 
so the percentage of real alerts processed decreases at the higher alert rate.  
The Tukey Test in Table 7-10 indicates that rules did perform significantly different from 
one another. Once again all of the Send Above Priority rules and all of the Connectivity Revision 
rules are in the top performing group of rules. The Send Above Priority and Connectivity 
Revision rules are joined by the SEB-DN-RS and CP-DN-RS rules as rules that performed 
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significantly better than the remaining rules for the percent of real alerts processed performance 
measure.  An additional analysis of variance and Tukey Test is performed on these top 
performing rules to see if they are also affected by the alert rate, and to see if the top performing 
rules differ significantly from one another.  
 
Table 7-10: ANOVA and Tukey Results of Percentage of Real Alerts Processed 
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P 
Rule 19 10.63 10.63 0.56 64.51 0.00
Topology 2 0.04 0.04 0.02 2.27 0.10
AlertRate 1 9.54 9.54 9.54 1100.11 0.00
Machines 1 0.02 0.02 0.02 2.24 0.14
Rule*Topology 38 1.13 1.12 0.03 3.39 0.00
Rule*AlertRate 19 5.65 5.65 0.30 34.28 0.00
Rule*Machines 19 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.23 1.00
Error 860 7.46 7.46 0.01   
Total 959 34.50     
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Rule Percent Significance 
SAP-PS-DN 97.6%             
SAP-RS-DN 97.6%             
SAP-CS-DN 97.6%             
CR-RS-DN 97.5%             
CR-CS-DN 97.4%             
CR-PS-PS 97.1%             
CR-PS-DN 97.1%             
SEB-DN-RS 95.7%             
CP-DN-RS 95.4%             
CP-DN-ES 89.8%             
CP-DN-PS 83.8%             
CP-DN-DN 83.2%             
SE-DN-RS 83.1%             
SE-DN-DN 80.9%             
SEB-DN-DN 80.7%             
SEB-DN-PS 80.7%             
SE-DN-PS 80.2%             
SEB-DN-IPT 70.5%             
SE-DN-IPT 69.4%             
CP-DN-IPT 64.3%             
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The Tukey Test in Table 7-11 did not reveal any significant differences between the Send 
Above Priority rules, Connectivity Revision rules, the CR-DN-RS rule or the SEB-DN-RS rule. 
Interestingly, increasing the number of layers in the network had a significant affect on the 
percentage of real alerts processed. This supports the hypothesis that more layers in a network 
increase the ability of the connectivity based rules to target and process the real alerts.  
The Send Above Priority and Connectivity Revision rules are able to process real alerts in 
a timely manner. Additionally, these rules process a significantly larger percentage of the real 
alerts in the system than the other rules tested.  
Table 7-11: ANOVA and Tukey Results for Top Performing Rules for Percentage of Real Alerts Processed 
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P 
Rule 8 0.0267 0.0269 0.0034 2.41 0.015
Topology 2 0.1322 0.1335 0.0667 47.94 0.000
AlertRate 1 0.1608 0.1606 0.1606 115.35 0.000
Machines 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.02 0.894
Rule*Topology 16 0.0278 0.0279 0.0017 1.25 0.225
Rule*AlertRate 8 0.0686 0.0686 0.0086 6.16 0.000
Rule*Machines 8 0.0009 0.0009 0.0001 0.08 1.000
Error 387 0.5387 0.5387 0.0014   
Total 431 0.9558     
 
Rule 
% Real 
Alerts Sig 
SAP-PS-DN 97.60%    
SAP-RS-DN 97.59%    
SAP-CS-DN 97.58%    
CR-RS-DN 97.54%    
CR-CS-DN 97.44%    
CR-PS-PS 97.12%    
CR-PS-DN 97.08%    
SEB-DN-RS 95.69%    
CP-DN-RS 95.40%    
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7.3.3 Percentage of Noise Alerts Processed 
The analysis of variance for the percentage of noise alerts processed indicates that all of 
the factors tested have a significant effect on the percentage of noise alerts processed. This can 
be seen in Table 7-12 where all the p-values are less than or equal to 0.008. The rule chosen, 
network topology, alert rate and number of machines in the network all have a significant effect 
on the percentage of noise alerts processed. The strongest effect was caused by the alert rate in 
the network. As the alert rate is increased from 100% to 115% of the fusion engine capacity, 
naturally the fusion engine is unable to process all of the additional alerts in the system, so the 
percentage of noise alerts processed will fall at the higher alert rate.  
The rules that processed significantly less noise include of the CR-PS-PS, CR-PS-DN, 
and CP-DN-RS rules. If an analyst has a fusion engine that is known to work poorly with lots of 
noise in the dataset, then choosing one of the three top performing rules could significantly 
reduce the noise processed by the fusion engine versus the other rules tested. Interestingly, this is 
the third performance measure in a row that has included the CR-PS-DN and CR-PS-PS rules 
among the top performing rules. 
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Table 7-12: ANOVA and Tukey Results for Percentage of Noise Alerts Processed 
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P 
Rule 19 0.426 0.428 0.023 155.87 0.000
Topology 2 0.088 0.086 0.043 295.85 0.000
AlertRate 1 2.899 2.897 2.897 20029.18 0.000
Machines 1 0.004 0.004 0.004 26.65 0.000
Rule*Topology 38 0.112 0.112 0.003 20.38 0.000
Rule*AlertRate 19 0.044 0.044 0.002 16.16 0.000
Rule*Machines 19 0.005 0.005 0.000 1.97 0.008
Error 860 0.124 0.124 0.000   
Total 959 3.704     
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rule 
Percent of 
Noise 
Processed Significance 
CR-PS-PS 87%             
CR-PS-DN 87%             
CP-DN-RS 88%             
CP-DN-ES 88%             
CP-DN-PS 89%             
CP-DN-DN 89%             
CP-DN-IPT 90%             
CR-CS-DN 92%             
CR-RS-DN 92%             
SE-DN-RS 92%             
SE-DN-DN 92%             
SAP-PS-DN 93%             
SAP-CS-DN 93%             
SAP-RS-DN 93%             
SE-DN-PS 93%             
SEB-DN-RS 93%             
SEB-DN-DN 93%             
SE-DN-IPT 93%             
SEB-DN-PS 93%             
SEB-DN-IPT 93%             
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7.3.4 Average Alerts Per Attack 
The ANOVA results in Table 7-13 indicate that the rule used, network topology and alert 
rate all have a significant affect on the average percentage of alerts processed per attack. The rule 
also has a significant interaction with the topology of the network as well as the alert rate. The 
number of machines in the network does not affect the average percentage of alerts processed per 
attack. While  
The Tukey Test in Table 7-13 demonstrates that there was a large group of rules that 
performed significantly better than others. The Send Above Priority and Connectivity Revision 
rules are once again among the top performing rules, and are joined by CP-DN-RS, and SEB-
DN-RS.  The Send Above Priority and Connectivity Revision rules are able to process alerts in a 
timely manner, process a high percentage of all real alerts, and are able to process a large 
percentage of each attack.  
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Table 7-13: ANOVA and Tukey Results for Average Percentage of Alerts/Attack 
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P 
Rule 19 4.542 4.542 0.239 420.00 0.000
Topology 2 0.042 0.042 0.021 36.92 0.000
AlertRate 1 3.193 3.195 3.195 5612.75 0.000
Machines 1 0.002 0.002 0.002 4.14 0.042
Rule*Topology 38 0.450 0.448 0.012 20.71 0.000
Rule*AlertRate 19 2.217 2.217 0.117 204.96 0.000
Rule*Machines 19 0.019 0.019 0.001 1.78 0.021
Error 860 0.490 0.490 0.001   
Total 959 10.954     
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.3.5 Standard Deviation of Average Alerts Per Attack 
The standard deviation of the alerts per attack provides a measure of the consistency with 
which a rule tracks multiple attacks. A low standard deviation indicates that a rule tracks each 
attack in the scenario with the same thoroughness. The ANOVA results for this performance 
measure can be seen in Table 7-14. The rule chosen as well as the alert rate of the system have a 
Rule 
Percent of 
Alerts/Attack Significance 
CP-DN-RS 98%            
SAP-PS-DN 98%            
SAP-CS-DN 98%            
SAP-RS-DN 98%            
CR-RS-DN 98%            
CR-CS-DN 98%            
SEB-DN-RS 98%            
CR-PS-PS 97%            
CR-PS-DN 97%            
CP-DN-ES 96%            
CP-DN-PS 93%            
SE-DN-RS 93%            
CP-DN-DN 93%            
SEB-DN-PS 92%            
SEB-DN-DN 91%            
SE-DN-DN 91%            
SE-DN-PS 91%            
SEB-DN-IPT 80%            
SE-DN-IPT 79%            
CP-DN-IPT 75%            
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significant affect on the standard deviation of alerts processed per attack. There is also a 
significant interaction between the rule and the network topology as well as the rule and the alert 
rate. The number of machines in the network does not affect the standard deviation of alerts per 
attack. 
Table 7-14: ANOVA and Tukey Results for Standard Deviation of Alerts Per Attack 
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P 
Rule 19 5.130 5.130 0.270 280.27 0.000
Topology 2 0.004 0.004 0.002 1.99 0.137
AlertRate 1 5.642 5.642 5.642 5856.68 0.000
Machines 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.36 0.548
Rule*Topology 38 0.201 0.200 0.005 5.46 0.000
Rule*AlertRate 19 4.005 4.005 0.211 218.81 0.000
Rule*Machines 19 0.009 0.009 0.000 0.48 0.971
Error 860 0.828 0.828 0.001   
Total 959 15.820     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Rule 
Stdev of 
Percent of 
Alert/Attack Significance 
SAP-PS-DN 2%            
CR-RS-DN 2%            
SAP-CS-DN 2%            
SAP-RS-DN 2%            
CR-CS-DN 2%            
CR-PS-DN 2%            
CR-PS-PS 3%            
SEB-DN-RS 4%            
CP-DN-RS 5%            
CP-DN-ES 10%            
SEB-DN-IPT 14%            
SE-DN-IPT 15%            
CP-DN-PS 15%            
CP-DN-DN 16%            
CP-DN-IPT 16%            
SE-DN-RS 17%            
SEB-DN-PS 19%            
SEB-DN-DN 20%            
SE-DN-DN 20%            
SE-DN-PS 20%            
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 The Tukey Test for the rules in Table 7-14 indicates that the Send Above Priority, 
Connectivity Revision, and the SEB-DN-RS rules performed significantly better than the other 
rules tested. The top performing rules are subjected to their own analysis of variance and Tukey 
Tests to determine if any of the top performing rules differ significantly from one another, and to 
see if the alert rate has as profound an effect on the top performers. The results of the ANOVA 
on the top performing rules can be seen in Table 7-15. 
 
 
Table 7-15: ANOVA and Tukey Results for the Top Performing Rules of the Standard Deviation of Alerts 
Processed Per Attack Performance Measure 
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P 
Rule 7 0.0133 0.0133 0.0019 16.06 0.000
Topology 2 0.0062 0.0064 0.0032 27.05 0.000
AlertRate 1 0.0751 0.0749 0.0749 633.06 0.000
Machines 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00 0.998
Rule*Topology 14 0.0027 0.0027 0.0002 1.64 0.068
Rule*AlertRate 7 0.0252 0.0252 0.0036 30.44 0.000
Rule*Machines 7 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.10 0.998
Error 344 0.0407 0.0407 0.0001   
Total 383 0.1633     
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
The ANOVA on the top performing rules indicates that the network topology and the 
alert rate are still important factors. The Tukey Test on the top performing rules themselves 
indicates that the SEB-DN-RS rule performs significantly worse than the other top performing 
rules. There were no significant differences between the Send Above Priority rules, and the 
Rule 
Stdev of 
Percent of 
Alert/Attack Sig 
SAP-PS-DN 1.86%     
CR-RS-DN 1.96%     
SAP-CS-DN 1.99%     
SAP-RS-DN 2.00%     
CR-CS-DN 2.05%     
CR-PS-DN 2.41%     
CR-PS-PS 2.53%     
SEB-DN-RS 3.72%     
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Connectivity Revision rules. These rules are able to track multiple attacks with the same 
accuracy. All of these rules appeared among the top performing rules for the average alerts 
processed per attack performance measure, which suggests that these rules are not only good at 
tracking attacks evenly, but are also good at tracking a large proportion of each attack. 
 
7.3.6 Average Bandwidth Used 
The ANOVA and Tukey results for average bandwidth usage can be seen below in Table 
7-16. The rule, topology, alert rate, and number of machines all have significant affects on the 
amount of bandwidth used. Additionally, there is a significant interaction between the rule and 
the topology as well as between the rule and the alert rate. The Tukey test on the rules indicates 
that the CR-PS-PS, CR-PS-DN, and CP-DN-RS rules performed significantly better than the 
other rules tested. These three rules used less bandwidth, which also means they sent fewer alerts 
to the fusion engine. All three of these rules were also among the rules that sent significantly less 
noise to the fusion engine, so the reduced bandwidth usage may coincide with the reduction in 
noise sent to the fusion engine by the rules. 
A reduction in bandwidth is only valuable if the rule is still processing a high percentage 
of real alerts in a timely manner. The CR-PS-PS and CR-PS-DN rules were among the top 
performing rules for the average time to process a real alert metric as well as the percentage of 
real alerts processed, average percentage of alerts per attack, and standard deviation of alerts per 
attack metrics. At stated earlier the CR-PS-PS and CR-PS-DN rules were also among the rules 
that successfully reduced noise sent to the fusion engine.  
 
 
 
 
 91 
Table 7-16: ANOVA and Tukey Results for Average Bandwidth Usage 
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P 
Rule 19 0.042 0.043 0.002 309.19 0.000
Topology 2 0.001 0.001 0.000 52.00 0.000
AlertRate 1 0.027 0.027 0.027 3719.08 0.000
Machines 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.11 0.739
Rule*Topology 38 0.004 0.004 0.000 15.73 0.000
Rule*AlertRate 19 0.022 0.022 0.001 156.69 0.000
Rule*Machines 19 0.001 0.001 0.000 4.82 0.000
Error 860 0.006 0.006 0.000   
Total 959 0.103     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.4 Discussion 
While reviewing each performance measure individually is important, all the 
performance measures analyzed together can be used to gain an understanding of which rules, if 
any, have significantly better performance than others. Table 7-17 displays each performance 
measure and the performance significance groups that each rule fell into. Rules with the lightest 
Rule 
Bandwidth 
(Mbs) Significance 
CR-PS-PS 0.150              
CR-PS-DN 0.151              
CP-DN-RS 0.155              
CP-DN-ES 0.159              
CP-DN-IPT 0.160              
CR-CS-DN 0.160              
CR-RS-DN 0.160              
SAP-CS-DN 0.160              
SAP-PS-DN 0.160              
SAP-RS-DN 0.160              
SEB-DN-RS 0.162              
CP-DN-PS 0.163              
SE-DN-IPT 0.164              
SEB-DN-IPT 0.165              
CP-DN-DN 0.166              
SE-DN-RS 0.168              
SEB-DN-PS 0.171              
SE-DN-PS 0.172              
SEB-DN-DN 0.173              
SE-DN-DN 0.173              
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gray areas beneath a performance measure are in the top performance group for that measure. 
Black shading means the rule was not in the top three performance groups. 
Table 7-17 clearly shows that the Connectivity Revision and Send Above Priority Rules 
are the best performing rules across many of the different performance measures. The Send 
Above Priority Rules and the Connectivity Revision rules are in the top performance group for 
the percentage of real alerts processed, the average percentage of alerts processed per attack, and 
the standard deviation of alerts processed per attack. In addition to these key measures the CR-
PS-DN and CR-PS-PS rules were also in the top performance group for the amount of noise sent 
to the fusion engine and the bandwidth use in the network. CR-PS-PS and CR-PS-DN rules are 
only rules that significantly reduced the amount of noise sent to the fusion engine, while still 
performing excellently for all other performance measures. The CR-PS-PS and CR-PS-DN rules 
were in the second performance group for the total time a real alert spends in the system, taking 
an average of 1.35 seconds longer to process a real alert than the Send Above Priority Rules. The 
Send Above Priority Rules have the fastest total time in system performance, processing real 
alerts in an average of 1.04 seconds. Since the Send Above Priority rules did not reduce the 
amount of noise sent to the fusion engine these rules effectively processed the most data in the 
least amount of time. 
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Table 7-17: Summary of Rule Performance Over All Performance Measures 
  
Avg Time 
to Process 
Real Alerts  
Real 
Alerts 
Processed 
Noise 
Alerts 
Processed  
Avg % 
of Alerts 
per 
Attack 
Std Dev of 
% of 
Alerts per 
Attack 
Avg 
Bandwidth
CR-PS-DN       
CR-PS-PS       
SAP-RS-DN       
SAP-CS-DN       
SAP-PS-DN       
CR-CS-DN       
CR-RS-DN       
CP-DN-RS       
SEB-DN-RS       
CP-DN-ES        
CP-DN-DN       
CP-DN-PS       
SE-DN-RS       
CP-DN-IPT       
SEB-DN-PS       
SE-DN-DN       
SE-DN-PS       
SEB-DN-DN       
SE-DN-IPT       
Key 
 
 Top Performance Group 
 Second Performance Group 
 Third Performance Group 
 Fourth or Higher Performance Group 
 
This experiment has not highlighted a one best rule for sensor management, but rather 
has shown there are several considerations to take when choosing a sensor management strategy. 
If bandwidth use and/or noise reduction are important concerns for a particular cyber security 
fusion system then rules such as the CR-PS-DN and CR-PS-PS rules have excellent performance 
across all performance measures, and reduce the amount of noise sent to the fusion engine which 
has the additional benefit of reducing bandwidth use. If bandwidth and noise reduction are not 
priorities for a cyber security system then the Send Above Priority rules have shown an ability to 
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process a high volume of real alerts extremely quickly, while still processing high volumes of 
noise alerts.  
 Another consideration when choosing between rules is whether the 1.35 second 
significant difference between the Send Above Priority rules and the Connectivity Revision rules 
is of practical significance. An analyst would have to ask himself, “Would my network security 
be impacted if I learned about attacks 1.35 seconds later?”  The answer to this question depends 
on a system’s typical reaction rate to attacks, and any intrusion prevention devices that the 
network may have that could stop an attack in progress. 
 Another consideration when deciding to use a sensor management rule is the ease with 
which a rule can be implemented into a real system. The Connectivity Revision rules have been 
shown to work well, but these rules rely heavily on the ability of a fusion engine to produce 
correct attack tracks. In this experiment the fusion engine was 100% accurate at identifying the 
attack tracks, but in a real system a fusion engine may generate false attack tracks, or miss attack 
tracks completely which could impact the performance of the connectivity based rules. In 
addition to fusion engine input, the Connectivity Revision rules require network topology 
information to be accurate. Providing the Connectivity Revision rules with accurate attack tracks 
from the fusion engine and network topology information may present several implementation 
challenges. Conversely, the Send Above Priority rules do not require fusion engine input or 
network topology information. The Send Above Priority rules work well regardless of how 
accurate the fusion engine is at producing attack tracks and how current network topology 
information for the network is. 
 There were some surprising results in the performance of two of the sub rules, 
particularly the performance of the priority sampling rule, and the poor performance of the 
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increase priority threshold rule. The ability of the CR-PS-DN and CR-PS-PS rules to reduce the 
amount of noise sent to the fusion engine while still performing well for all other performance 
measures deserves some additional attention. The priority sampling rule employed has the 
benefit of reducing the amount of noise sent to the fusion engine. This is most likely caused by 
the polling mechanism the priority sampling rule employs. Recall that the priority sampling rule 
polls all sensors for one alert, records the priority of the alert received, and then re-polls the 
sensor that sent the alert with the highest priority. The initial polling of all sensors is done the 
first time the rule is called, and then again every ten times the rule is used, or roughly every ten 
seconds. If a sensor has no alerts to send at the initial polling, the sensor will not be polled again 
for ten seconds. During this time alerts may arrive at the sensor that will have to wait until 
another polling of all sensors before they have a chance to be sent. The alerts available from the 
other sensors that had alerts at the initial polling may not be enough to fill the fusion engine 
capacity, so less alerts are sent to the fusion engine during that time period. 
The increase priority threshold rule’s performed extremely poorly even though the rule  
was designed to improve performance. Reasons for the increase priority rule’s poor performance 
can be attributed to at least two factors including the interval that the queue at the fusion engine 
is checked and the distribution of alerts over the different priorities. The one second interval 
between checking the length of the fusion engine queue sometimes allowes thousands of alerts to 
flood the fusion engine. During a one second interval there is a possibility that the fusion engine 
could go from having zero alerts in queue to 6,000 alerts, the maximum allowed by bandwidth in 
once second. This onslaught of alerts does not allow the increase priority threshold rule any 
chance to increase the priority threshold in hopes of reducing the number of alerts sent to the 
fusion engine. By the time the queue is checked, the queue length is already passed the final 
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threshold level. One way to combat this problem is to check the fusion engine queue length more 
often than every second, and in a best case scenario check the length of the fusion engine queue 
each time an alert is added to the queue. Decreasing the time interval between checking the 
fusion engine queue will allow the increase priority threshold rule a chance to increase the 
priority threshold in order to stop the growth of the queue. Decreasing the time interval may 
increase the processing requirements of this rule which may have a negative impact on the 
system as a whole.  
A second factor in the poor performance of the increase priority threshold rule is the 
distribution of priorities of alerts in the system. The overwhelming majority of alerts were 
priority level 0 alerts, or reconnaissance alerts. Having a large percentage of priority level zero 
alerts means that when the queue length at the fusion engine reduces and the increase priority 
threshold rule is able to reduce the threshold level back down to a priority level of zero, a huge 
volume of alerts becomes available and is sent to the fusion engine in the following one second 
interval. This causes the priority threshold rule to increase the threshold to the highest level 
immediately after just reducing the threshold. This problem could be combated in two ways. 
Firstly, the sensors could perform some archiving function of low priority alerts that are not sent 
after a period of time, so that the fusion engine is not flooded with the old low priority alerts 
once the priority level is reduced. Secondly, a new priority scheme could be developed that has 
more levels and more evenly distributes the alert types across all the levels. 
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8 CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research has demonstrated the importance of sensor management strategies to a 
properly functioning cyber information fusion system. Unique event based sensor management 
rules have been developed, a simulation environment has been created to test the sensor 
management rules, and an experiment has been designed and performed. The experiment 
highlights several rules robust performance as well as indicates factors that are important to the 
performance of sensor management rules. 
In general, the sensor management strategies that perform the best are those that keep the 
queue at the fusion engine short. The Connectivity Revision and Send Above Priority rules do an 
excellent job of feeding the fusion engine exactly what the engine can process, thereby keeping 
the queue short and the system as a whole very responsive.  
Several factors may influence an analyst’s decision to implement a particular rule. These 
factors may include whether or not the analyst’s fusion engine is sensitive to high volumes of 
noise, whether the network has tight bandwidth restrictions that must be met, and how fast the 
typical reaction rate to an attack in progress is. If the analyst is extremely concerned about the 
volume of noise at the fusion engine or bandwidth use, he may want to consider the Connectivity 
Revision-Priority Sampling rules. These rules send significantly less noise to the fusion engine, 
while still processing the same amount of real alerts as the other top performing rules. The 
Connectivity – Priority Sampling rules decrease noise sent and bandwidth use, but the average 
time taken to process a real alert is slightly higher than the Send Above Priority Rules. If the 
time to process alerts is of high importance, or bandwidth use and the amount of noise sent to the 
fusion engine are not big concerns, then the Send Above Priority rules may be a good choice. 
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These rules were among the best performing rules for their ability to process alerts quickly, 
process a high percentage of real alerts, and process alerts from multiple attacks evenly. 
In addition to identifying sensor management strategies that worked well, this research 
also identifies network factors that affect the performance of sensor management rules. The 
network topology has a large affect on the connectivity based sensor management rules. As the 
number of layers in the network increases, the connectivity based sensor management rules see 
an increase in performance. Specifically, as the number of layers in the network increases the 
connectivity based rules improve their ability to send less noise to the fusion engine. The alert 
rate of the network also has a large affect on the performance of sensor management rules. At the 
low alert rate many sensor management rules perform well, but at higher alert rates the rules that 
pay more attention to the constraints in the network have better performance. In future research 
including both the network topology and alert rate would be important factors to include in an 
experiment. The number of machines in the network does not have a significant affect on the 
performance of rules, and may be left out of future experiments.  
There is a considerable amount of future research that could be done on this topic. 
Additional research could include changing the simulation environment, including different 
experimental factors, incorporating a more accurate fusion engine into the simulation model, and 
the developing more rules. 
In future experiments a larger number of scenarios could be evaluated along with more 
replications of each scenario. In this experiment one scenario setup is used in an attempt to 
capture a variety of attack conditions that may occur during any given scenario. In future 
experiments, several different scenarios could be tried on one network configuration to ensure 
that rules perform consistently for several different attack conditions. Scenarios could include a 
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higher percentage of real alerts to investigate the performance of rules when the rate of real alerts 
exceeds the fusion engine capacity. Additionally, including more scenario replications could help 
to differentiate the performance of the rules.  
In this experiment the fusion queue length thresholds are set to 60 seconds for the max 
queue and 6 seconds for the threshold. These threshold queue levels are kept constant for all the 
rules tested. The performance of the over capacity rules can likely be improved by adjusting 
these threshold levels to other values.  
The interval set to monitor the fusion engine queue length is set to once every second. 
This interval could be made smaller, so that the fusion engine queue has less of a chance to grow. 
The interval between monitoring the fusion engine queue length could be changed to check the 
queue every time an alert is added to the fusion engine queue. Dynamically checking the fusion 
engine queue could increase the processing requirements of a sensor management system, but at 
the same time checking the queue more often could drastically improve the performance of many 
of the over capacity rules. 
The fusion engine model in this research processed all attacks with 100% accuracy. In a 
real information fusion system a fusion engine may create attack tracks for attacks that do not 
exist, or conversely miss attack tracks for attacks that do exist. The connectivity based rules of 
this research rely heavily on the performance of the fusion engine in order to control the settings 
of sensors. In future research, a fusion engine could be modeled more accurately to include the 
creation of false attack tracks, or to miss attacks in order to study the affect a suboptimal fusion 
engine has on the connectivity based rules.  
Finally, changes could be made to the cyber simulation environment. An interface could 
be developed to allow a new user to easily create and test new rules without needing to know 
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how to program in Java. The sensor management package could also be streamlined so that a 
new user could easily code new rules without having to make updates to several classes and 
functions.  
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APPENDECIES 
Appendix I: Detailed Experimental Results 
 
 This appendix contains the average rule performance of each of the original 58 rule 
combinations tested.  The results are presented in tables grouped by the main rule.  There are 
tables for the Send Everything Rules, Connectivity and Priority Rules, Send Above Priority 
Rules, Send Everything in Batches Rules, and Connectivity Revision Rules.   
 
Table I-1: Average Performance of the Send Everything Rules over Experimental Factors 
Rule 
Avg. Time 
to Process 
Real Alerts 
(mins) 
Real 
Alerts 
Processed
(%) 
Noise 
Alerts 
Processed
(%) 
Avg. % of 
Alerts per 
Attack 
(%) 
Std Dev of 
% of Alerts 
per Attack 
(%) 
Avg. 
Bandwidth 
(Mbs) 
SE-DN-RS 16.420 83.1 92.5 92.6 16.5 0.169
SE-DN-IPT 30.872 69.4 92.7 79.0 15.0 0.165
SE-DN-DN 36.218 80.9 92.5 90.9 19.9 0.174
SE-DN-PS 37.701 80.2 92.5 90.8 20.1 0.173
Topology       
1 Layer 28.154 81.3 93.0 90.8 16.4 0.170
3 Layer 30.970 75.7 92.3 87.4 18.8 0.170
5 Layer 31.783 78.2 92.2 86.8 18.4 0.171
Alert Rate           
100% 6.762 95.3 98.5 97.6 3.7 0.162
115% 53.843 61.6 86.6 79.0 32.1 0.179
Machines           
250 29.593 79.3 92.6 88.6 17.8 0.170
1000 31.012 77.6 92.5 88.1 18.0 0.170
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Table I-2: Average Performance of the Connectivity and Priority Rules over Experimental Factors 
Rule 
Avg. Time 
to Process 
Real Alerts 
(mins) 
Real 
Alerts 
Processed
(%) 
Noise 
Alerts 
Processed
(%) 
Avg. % of 
Alerts per 
Attack 
(%) 
Std Dev of 
% of Alerts 
per Attack 
(%) 
Avg. 
Bandwidth 
(Mbs) 
CP-CS-RS 9.109 94.8 92.3 98.3 4.5 0.163
CP-DN-RS 8.831 95.4 87.8 98.1 4.8 0.155
CP-PS-RS 9.029 95.5 91.1 98.4 4.1 0.161
CP-RS-RS 8.354 95.6 92.3 98.4 3.9 0.162
CP-CS-ES  15.284 89.8 92.4 96.6 9.2 0.166
CP-DN-ES  15.272 89.8 88.2 96.3 9.8 0.159
CP-PS-ES  15.368 89.6 91.3 96.5 9.7 0.164
CP-RS-ES  15.318 90.0 92.4 96.7 9.1 0.166
CP-CS-PS 29.825 82.7 92.5 92.8 16.5 0.171
CP-DN-PS 26.392 83.8 88.9 93.0 15.3 0.164
CP-PS-PS 26.789 72.8 91.7 81.8 15.0 0.168
CP-RS-PS 31.668 82.5 92.5 92.3 17.3 0.172
CP-CS-DN 29.122 83.4 92.5 92.7 15.9 0.171
CP-DN-DN 28.827 83.1 89.2 92.5 16.3 0.165
CP-PS-DN 29.133 83.3 91.6 92.6 16.1 0.169
CP-RS-DN 29.180 83.3 92.5 92.7 16.0 0.171
CP-CS-IPT 33.023 64.7 92.7 75.1 16.3 0.164
CP-DN-IPT 37.811 64.3 89.9 74.5 16.5 0.159
CP-PS-IPT 36.433 65.5 91.9 75.4 16.4 0.163
CP-RS-IPT 36.180 64.7 92.7 75.0 16.6 0.165
Topology       
1 Layer 24.042 82.9 92.0 91.6 14.0 0.166
3 Layer 24.033 81.0 91.1 90.2 12.4 0.165
5 Layer 22.567 84.3 90.9 89.7 11.0 0.164
Alert Rate             
100% 3.518 97.2 96.8 98.3 2.8 0.158
115% 43.577 68.2 85.9 82.7 22.1 0.172
Machines             
250 23.296 83.2 91.2 12.3 90.8 0.165
1000 23.799 82.2 91.4 12.6 90.1 0.165
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Table I-3: Average Performance of the Send Above Priority Rules over Experimental Factors 
Rule 
Avg. Time 
to Process 
Real Alerts 
(mins) 
Real 
Alerts 
Processed
(%) 
Noise 
Alerts 
Processed
(%) 
Avg. % of 
Alerts per 
Attack 
(%) 
Std Dev of 
% of Alerts 
per Attack 
(%) 
Avg. 
Bandwidth 
(Mbs) 
SAP-CS-DN 0.013 97.5 92.5 98.0 2.0 0.160
SAP-PS-DN 0.032 97.6 92.5 98.0 1.9 0.160
SAP-RS-DN 0.013 97.5 92.5 98.0 2.0 0.160
Topology       
1 Layer 0.019 95.5 93.7 97.2 2.5 0.160
3 Layer 0.019 98.7 92.0 98.3 1.8 0.160
5 Layer 0.019 98.4 91.9 98.5 1.5 0.160
Alert Rate           
100% 0.020 98.7 98.4 99.5 0.9 0.160
115% 0.018 96.4 86.7 96.5 3.0 0.160
Machines           
250 0.019 97.4 92.3 97.9 2.0 0.160
1000 0.020 97.7 92.7 98.1 1.9 0.160
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Table I-4: Average Performance of the Send Everything In Batches Rules over Experimental Factors 
Rule 
Avg. Time 
to Process 
Real Alerts 
(mins) 
Real 
Alerts 
Processed
(%) 
Noise 
Alerts 
Processed
(%) 
Avg. % of 
Alerts per 
Attack 
(%) 
Std Dev of 
% of Alerts 
per Attack 
(%) 
Avg. 
Bandwidth 
(Mbs) 
SEB-CS-RS 16.772 87.4 92.4 95.0 11.5 0.170
SEB-DN-RS 19.163 95.7 92.5 97.4 3.8 0.164
SEB-PS-RS 16.964 85.3 92.4 94.1 13.9 0.170
SEB-RS-RS 17.012 87.4 92.4 94.9 11.6 0.170
SEB-CS-IPT 32.290 69.7 92.7 78.9 14.9 0.164
SEB-DN-IPT 31.844 70.4 92.9 79.5 14.2 0.165
SEB-PS-IPT 30.209 70.5 92.7 79.2 14.4 0.165
SEB-RS-IPT 30.585 70.4 92.7 79.0 14.5 0.164
SEB-CS-PS 37.734 80.5 92.5 91.1 19.8 0.173
SEB-DN-PS 36.637 80.6 92.7 91.5 19.0 0.172
SEB-PS-PS 29.324 74.2 92.6 82.5 14.3 0.170
SEB-RS-PS 37.242 80.6 92.5 91.1 19.8 0.173
SEB-CS-DN 37.542 80.7 92.5 90.7 20.2 0.174
SEB-DN-DN 36.524 80.7 92.7 91.0 19.6 0.173
SEB-PS-DN 37.545 80.7 92.5 90.7 20.2 0.174
SEB-RS-DN 37.543 80.7 92.5 90.7 20.2 0.174
Topology      
1 Layer 27.381 82.3 93.2 90.9 15.0 0.169
3 Layer 31.280 76.9 92.3 87.6 16.6 0.170
5 Layer 32.263 80.0 92.2 87.2 15.6 0.170
Alert Rate           
100% 7.115 95.1 98.5 97.5 3.8 0.161
115% 53.501 64.3 86.7 79.7 27.6 0.178
Machines           
250 29.901 80.8 92.5 89.1 15.6 0.170
1000 30.715 78.6 92.6 88.0 15.9 0.169
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Table I-5: Average Performance of the Connectivity Revision Rules over Experimental Factors 
Rule 
Avg. Time 
to Process 
Real Alerts 
(mins) 
Real 
Alerts 
Processed
(%) 
Noise 
Alerts 
Processed
(%) 
Avg. % of 
Alerts per 
Attack 
(%) 
Std Dev of 
% of Alerts 
per Attack 
(%) 
Avg. 
Bandwidth 
(Mbs) 
CR-CS-DN 0.013 97.4 92.3 97.8 2.0 0.160
CR-CS-ES 0.013 97.4 92.3 97.8 2.0 0.160
CR-CS-IPT 0.013 97.4 92.3 97.8 2.0 0.160
CR-CS-PS 0.013 97.4 92.3 97.8 2.0 0.160
CR-CS-RS 0.013 97.4 92.3 97.8 2.0 0.160
CR-RS-DN 0.035 97.5 92.3 98.0 2.0 0.160
CR-RS-ES  0.035 97.5 92.3 98.0 2.0 0.160
CR-RS-IPT 0.035 97.5 92.3 98.0 2.0 0.160
CR-RS-PS 0.035 97.5 92.3 98.0 2.0 0.160
CR-RS-RS 0.035 97.5 92.3 98.0 2.0 0.160
CR-PS-DN 0.087 97.1 87.1 97.2 2.4 0.151
CR-PS-ES  0.042 97.1 87.1 97.2 2.4 0.151
CR-PS-IPT 0.041 97.1 87.1 97.3 2.4 0.151
CR-PS-PS 0.042 97.1 87.0 97.2 2.5 0.151
CR-PS-RS 0.042 97.1 87.1 97.2 2.4 0.151
Topology   
1 Layer 0.019 95.1 92.5 96.8 2.7 0.159
3 Layer 0.029 98.7 90.6 98.1 1.9 0.158
5 Layer 0.050 98.3 88.5 98.1 1.8 0.154
Alert Rate           
100% 0.041 98.7 96.6 99.3 1.0 0.157
115% 0.024 96.0 84.5 96.0 3.3 0.157
Machines           
250 0.034 97.4 90.6 97.7 2.1 0.157
1000 0.031 97.3 90.5 97.7 2.2 0.157
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Appendix II: Cyber Attack Simulator and Results CD 
 
 The enclosed CD contains the version of the Cyber Attack Simulator used for this 
research as well as all the raw data collected from each of the simulation runs.  The Cyber Attack 
Simulator contains two versions, a raw code version and an executable JAR file.  The Java 
Development Kit version 1.5.0 used for this model is also included on the disc.  To run the Cyber 
Attack Executable Jar File, copy the folder “Cyber Attack Executable” to a local computer.  
Once the “Cyber Attack Executable” folder has been copied to a local machine, open the folder 
and double click the “CyberAttackSimulator” file to run the simulator. 
 The six network configurations are included in the save files, and can be accessed 
through the open network dialog within the Cyber Attack Simulator.  Each network file includes 
the twelve hour attack scenario used for that network.  Table II-1 contains a list of the enclosed 
folders along with a short description.   
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Table II-1: CD Folder Contents and Description 
Folder Name Description 
Cyber Attack Executable This folder contains all the files necessary to 
run the cyber attack simulator executable JAR 
file.  Copy this entire folder to a local machine, 
then double click the “CyberAttackSimulator” 
file to run the attack simulator. 
Cyber Attack Simulator Java Code This folder contains all the raw java files that a 
user can use to extend the cyber attack 
simulator.     
Results This folder contains 12 excel files that hold all 
the raw data for each simulation run of the 
experiment.  The file names include the 
network topology, network size, and alert rate 
of the enclosed data.  A number of 175,000 in 
the file name indicates an alert rate of 100% 
while a 200,000 indicates an alert rate of 
115%.  Each file contains four worksheets, 
each worksheet’s name contains the random 
number seed used in the simulation run to 
create the data. 
JDK This folder contains the Java development kit 
used for the creation of the Cyber Attack 
Simulator. 
 
 
